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Patrick Montagner
ECB representative to the the Supervisory Board
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  • SPEECH

Impact of demographic change on Europe’s economy, banking sector and supervision

Keynote speech by Patrick Montagner, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the 14th Regulatory Conference of the Deutsche Bundesbank University of Applied Sciences

Frankfurt am Main, 20 November 2026

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss demographic change and its implications for Europe’s economy and banking sector. A year ago I wrote about Europe’s demographic shift and what it could mean for banking supervision. Since then, the case for examining this issue has not diminished. If anything, it has grown stronger. I would therefore like to circle back to this subject today, drawing on the latest data and considering more closely the story they tell about Europe’s economy, banking sector and banking supervision.

The demographic picture

Before turning to the data, let me be clear about what we are discussing. My aim is to simply look at demographic trends and their implications, not to pass judgement on them.

The decision to have children lies at the intersection of a person’s individual choice, health and economic circumstances, housing situation and broader social factors. For the purposes of this speech, the fertility rate is defined as the average number of children born per woman, which is a commonly used indicator of the renewal of generations. In the same vein, average life expectancy can vary depending on socio-economic status, gender and the quality of health and social security systems. Today I want to focus on the main outcome of these trends, which is the rising share of older people in the population.

In a blog post a year ago I noted that the fertility rate in many EU countries was around 1.5 births per woman.[1] The EU-wide figure has actually been below this level for some time and has continued to decline, falling from 1.46 in 2022 to 1.38 in 2023, and, according to data published by Eurostat this March, to 1.34 in 2024. This is the lowest level recorded since comparable EU statistics began in 2001. Fertility rates are even lower in several Member States. In Spain, for example, the rate is close to 1.1.

People are also having children later in life. A woman’s average age when she has her first child is now 29.9 years, while the average age at childbirth rose from 29.0 in 2001 to 31.3 in 2024.[2]

At the start of 2025, 22% of the EU population was aged 65 or over, compared with less than 18% 15 years earlier. There are now just over three people of working age for every person aged 65 or over.[3] Eurostat projects that by 2050 around three in ten people in the EU will be aged 65 or over.[4] The working-age population is projected to shrink by some 65 million people by the end of the century, while the number of people aged 80 and over is expected to increase by a factor of two and a half over the same horizon.[5]

Recent data suggest that demographic change may be advancing faster than many projections indicated only a year ago. The German Federal Statistical Office recently published a new population forecast that is significantly lower than its previous projection. Revised assumptions about net immigration to Germany are the main reason behind this change. In the past, net migration offset that gap. In 2025, however, it may no longer have done so[6].

At almost the same time, France’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies published its figures for 2025, revealing that for the first time since 1945, France’s natural population balance turned negative.

This demographic shift is occurring globally, albeit at very different stages. The world’s total fertility rate stood at 2.2 in 2024, down from 2.25 the year before. Projections have also changed substantially. Ten years ago the United Nations expected the global fertility rate to fall below the replacement threshold of 2.1 around 2073. Its latest assessment brings that date forward to 2050. More than half the world’s countries, home to over two-thirds of the global population, are already below the replacement fertility level, and many of these countries have already seen their populations peak.[7]

Parts of Asia illustrate how quickly populations can age. In Japan, the share of the population aged 65 or over is already close to 30% and is projected to reach around 38% by the middle of the century. In South Korea, it currently stands at roughly 20% and is set to approach 40%. Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and mainland China are all already experiencing population decline, and Asia’s population as a whole is projected to peak around 2054.[8]

Demographic change is therefore a structural shift, although its timing and intensity vary across countries and have different implications for their economies.

Economic outcomes are not shaped by demographic projections alone. Migration, labour force participation, productivity and policy choices can all influence how demographic change affects the economy. But a population’s current age structure changes only gradually, meaning that demographic trends have a lasting influence, making them particularly relevant for long-term analysis.

Today I would like to explain why demographic trends are slow to reverse, before going on to consider how a smaller and older population could affect the wider economy. I would then like to look at the impact this could have on banks and their customers, before discussing how these developments could be incorporated into supervisory analysis.

Why demographic trends are slow to reverse

I would like to begin by highlighting that, owing to population momentum, even a significant increase in the fertility rate would take time to affect the size of the working-age population.

In ageing societies, the number of women of childbearing age shrinks. As a result, even a substantial increase in the fertility rate would initially only result in a limited increase in the number of births. Demographers refer to this as population momentum, and it can be illustrated with a few figures.

Most EU countries, as well as Japan, South Korea and China have a long history of low fertility. Across this group, the number of women of reproductive age fell from 669 million in 1994 to 634 million in 2024. This number is projected to decrease even further to around 474 million by 2054, a decline of 25% in just three decades. Births are therefore likely to continue falling even if fertility rates increase moderately. Based on the UN’s central projections, any increase in fertility rates would be partly offset by the continuing decline in the number of women of reproductive age.[9]

Public policies can support parents and help them reconcile family and working life. However, decisions about whether and when to have children depend on a broad range of personal, social and economic factors. The available evidence does not suggest that any single policy instrument can rapidly or substantially alter demographic trends.

Lower birth rates are only one part of the demographic shift. Longer life expectancy is also changing the composition of Europe’s population, leading to longer periods spent in retirement and making it increasingly important to support older people in remaining economically active for longer.

Europe’s workforce[10] and customer base over the next two to three decades will therefore be shaped largely by the population’s current age structure. Future decisions to have children will matter, but their economic effects will take considerable time to emerge. Demographic change is structural, and its effects will persist over the horizons relevant for banking supervision. Supervisors should therefore assess these developments before they become material vulnerabilities.

What a changing population means for the wider economy

Demographic change affects the wider economy in which banks operate.[11] The implications of this change for banks cannot be separated from broader shifts in household demand, labour supply and economic activity.

It is useful to distinguish between the effect of two demographic changes, i.e. that of a smaller population and that of an older population. The two can differ considerably, even within the same sector.

The effects will not be felt evenly across the economy. Housing markets may have fewer first-time buyers and, over time, a greater supply of homes in regions with declining populations. At the same time, longer life expectancy, structural housing shortages and affordability constraints are already delaying access to home ownership for many younger households. These demographic shifts may interact with housing markets in very different ways across regions.

Demand for health and long-term care is likely to rise, even as these sectors face acute labour shortages. Consumer spending may shift away from goods associated with younger families towards health, mobility and leisure. By contrast, education systems will need to adjust to declining student numbers, with potential consequences for the future workforce and research capacity.

Population ageing may also lead to difficult political choices regarding the composition of public expenditure. Without more people working, increased productivity or policy changes, an increase in spending related to ageing populations could reduce the resources available for education, research and infrastructure, potentially weighing on future economic growth.

This could have particularly significant consequences for human capital and innovation. A recent European Commission foresight exercise projects around 2.5 million fewer higher education students in the EU by 2050 and a labour force that is around 12% smaller.[12]

Analysis by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) outlines the main channels through which ageing may affect growth. In the EU, the Western Balkans and the eastern European economies covered by the study, population ageing alone is projected to reduce annual growth in GDP per capita by an average of 0.36 percentage points between now and 2050.

One way in which ageing may affect growth is through innovation. As the EBRD notes, a shrinking pool of researchers is already acting as a headwind to innovation in ageing economies. These estimates do not account for any future productivity gains from the effective use of artificial intelligence.[13]

My ECB colleague Isabel Schnabel recently made a related point from a monetary policy perspective. She argued that demographic ageing, moderating immigration and other structural factors are making labour increasingly scarce and contributing to wage pressures in the euro area. At the same time, she noted that productivity gains from artificial intelligence could, over time, help ease these supply-side constraints, although both their timing and magnitude remain highly uncertain.[14]

These wider economic changes will also affect financial institutions and markets. Population ageing may influence household portfolios, with older households tending to hold safer and more liquid assets. It may also alter the business models of insurers and pension funds as saving and spending patterns evolve. In addition, rising pension and healthcare expenditure may place pressure on public finances. Through the sovereign-bank nexus, these pressures could ultimately affect the banks supervised by the ECB.[15]

These effects are likely to emerge gradually rather than after a single shock. As I said a year ago, that is exactly what makes them easy to overlook and why I think it is worth setting out the fuller economic picture before looking at banks specifically.

What demographic change could mean for banks and their customers

So what could these developments mean for banks?

A year ago I described the channels through which demographic change might affect bank balance sheets in general terms. Since then new empirical research has provided more detailed evidence on these transmission channels.

Recent research by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) covered more than 4,000 banks across 56 economies over a period of three decades. It found that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of older people in the population is associated with declines of 5.2 percentage points in the loan-to-deposit ratio and 1.4 percentage points in the loan-to-asset ratio. These results suggest that ageing changes the composition of bank balance sheets, increasing the relative importance of deposits and liquidity while reducing lending. They are also consistent with international banking groups allocating a smaller share of their assets to more rapidly ageing markets.[16]

While the reasons behind these effects require further study, the findings strengthen the evidence that demographic change affects both bank balance sheets and the geographic allocation of banking activity. Further research is needed to determine the magnitude and persistence of these effects.

What can be inferred from this study and others[17] is that, on the asset side, a fall in the number of younger households could reduce demand for mortgages and consumer credit in ageing regions. Debt repayment by older households could reinforce this effect. In areas experiencing population decline, weaker housing demand may also affect property prices and collateral values.

On the liability side, the picture is more nuanced. Older customers may currently contribute to stable retail deposit bases, consistent with the IMF evidence I just mentioned. But providing a service to older customers may also require more personalised support and continued access to physical channels, which can be costly to maintain. At the same time, younger customers may move towards urban markets or digital providers. Banks in ageing regions may therefore have to strike a difficult balance between maintaining accessible branch networks and investing in digital services.

The digitalisation of banking raises a related question. Banks need to understand whether older customers primarily face barriers related to access and digital skills, or whether concerns about fraud, technology and personal data are equally important. Their digital strategies should address these barriers while maintaining suitable alternatives for customers who cannot easily use digital channels.

Demographic change may also create business opportunities. The growth of the “silver economy” may increase demand for wealth management, retirement planning and advice on how to draw down accumulated savings. The transfer of wealth between generations is also likely to play an important role. Banks that hold the savings of older customers will not automatically retain those assets when they are transferred to younger family members, particularly if those family members live elsewhere or use different banks.

Banks will need to consider how these activities fit within their broader business strategy, particularly where traditional lending is likely to decline. This may generate new sources of revenue, but banks will need appropriate products, expertise and distribution channels to capture those opportunities.

From a supervisory perspective, the uneven distribution of these effects will be important. Demographic risk is likely to be concentrated in specific regions and business models. Smaller banks operating in depopulating regions may face several pressures simultaneously: a shrinking customer base, challenges in recruiting and replacing retiring staff and managers, and limited capacity to finance digital transformation.

These challenges may be especially relevant for locally focused banks. Supervisors should therefore assess whether these institutions have credible plans to adjust their cost base, distribution channels and service offerings to a changing demographic.

Implications for supervisory analysis

Public authorities are increasing their focus on demographic change.

This is also becoming more visible in the work of central banks. Pablo Hernández de Cos examined the implications of population ageing for credit demand and financial stability in 2020.[18] More recently, Isabel Schnabel discussed its effects on labour supply, wages and inflation. The ECB’s 2025 Financial Stability Review also considered the implications of demographic change for corporate fundamentals, sovereign debt sustainability and financial institutions’ business models.

An even more recent study prepared by external experts for the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs examined demographic change specifically as a slow-moving structural risk for banks and supervisors. The study considers how demographic pressures could be reflected in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) through banks’ business models, governance arrangements, capital risks and funding profiles. It also highlights the challenge of assessing developments that unfold over several decades within supervisory frameworks that typically cover much shorter horizons.[19]

Taken together, these developments show that demographic change is becoming a more prominent part of financial stability and supervisory analysis.

This is also reflected in the ECB’s supervisory priorities for 2026-28, published last November. These priorities identify demographic change alongside geopolitical tension, climate and nature-related risk, and technological disruption, as one of the structural shifts raising the likelihood of tail risks across the banking sector.[20] In other words, demographic change forms part of the broader environment in which banks operate and supervisors assess risk.

This does not mean that ECB Banking Supervision needs a separate framework for demographic risk at this stage. The most natural starting point is the existing assessment of banks’ business models. Demographic change may affect the sustainability of lending, deposit franchises, revenue streams and distribution networks. It may also have implications for governance and succession planning, particularly for institutions operating in ageing or depopulating regions.

Demographic change also raises several supervisory questions.

  • Could demand for mortgages or consumer credit decline structurally in certain regions?
  • How might demographic change affect consolidation, branch networks and banks’ capacity to invest in digitalisation?
  • Which regions and which banks are most exposed, and do they have credible strategies to adapt?
  • What can we learn from economies in Asia and elsewhere where population ageing is more advanced?

Ultimately, the objective is to assess the long-term sustainability of a bank’s business model and strategy, and this is where the supervisory assessment should start.

Conclusion

Last year I described demographic change as a slow-moving structural trend. Today we have more evidence on how it may affect the economy and the banking sector. Central bankers and supervisors are also paying more attention to demographic change. Its effects will unfold gradually, but they are likely to extend well beyond the time horizons that supervisors typically consider. That is precisely what makes them easy to overlook.

The challenge for supervisors is to identify these structural shifts before they give rise to material vulnerabilities. Europe’s demographic shift will unfold over decades. But banks and supervisors cannot wait decades to respond. Understanding these developments and preparing for them is a task for today.

Thank you.

  1. Montagner, P. (2025), “Europe's demographic shift: what could it mean for banking supervision?”, The Supervision Blog, ECB, 25 November.

  2. Eurostat (2026), “Fertility statistics”, Statistics Explained, 19 March.

  3. Eurostat (2026), “Population structure and ageing”, Statistics Explained, 2 February.

  4. Eurostat (2026), “Population projections at regional level”, Statistics Explained, based on the EUROPOP2025 regional projections, July.

  5. Eurostat (2026), “Population projections in the EU", Statistics Explained, based on the EUROPOP2025 population projections, April.

  6. Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) (2026), 16th coordinated population projection

  7. United Nations (2025), World Fertility 2024, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.

  8. Li, H., Liu, E., Lu, Y. and Oeking, A. (2026), “Graying Asia: How Aging Is Reshaping Banking”, IMF Working Paper, Vol. 26, Issue 150, 17 July.

  9. See footnote 7.

  10. Mentzelopoulou, M.M. (2025), “Demographic changes and labour migration within the EU”, briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, 11 April.

  11. Davis, E.P., Karim, D. (2025), “Ageing and financial markets - a literature survey”, Discussion Paper, No 568, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, May.

  12. European Commission (2025), The Demographic Turn: Actions Needed for Research, Innovation and Policy in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, December.

  13. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2025), Transition Report 2025-26: Brave Old World.

  14. Schnabel, I. (2026), “Navigating inflation and employment in an era of supply shocks and AI”, speech at the 2026 US Monetary Policy Forum, New York, 6 March.

  15. Gardó, S., Klaus, B., Kurig, D. and Storz, M. (2025), “Navigating financial stability in an ageing world”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, May.

  16. See footnote 8.

  17. Imam, P.A. and Schmieder, C. (2024), “Ageing Gracefully: Steering the Banking Sector through Demographic Shifts”, BIS Working Papers, No 1193, Bank for International Settlements, June.

  18. Hernández de Cos, P. (2020), “Challenges of population ageing from a central bank perspective”, public lecture at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB), Geneva, 3 March.

  19. Almeida, R., Haselmann, R., Heider, F. and Tröger, T. (2026), “SREP, P2R, and “slow-burning” risks to EU banks”, European Parliament, September.

  20. ECB Banking Supervision (2025), SSM Supervisory Priorities for 2026-28, ECB, 18 November.

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