- FIRESIDE CHAT
Strong, but not immune: resilience in an age of uncertainty
Conversation between Sharon Donnery, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, and Kian Abouhossein, Managing Director at JP Morgan, at the European Financials Conference hosted by JP Morgan, London
19 November 2026
Maybe we can start with the aggregated results of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), which were presented this morning. Can you provide a brief overview of the key takeaways from the exercise this year?
The main takeaway is that the euro area banking sector remains broadly resilient, but this is no reason for complacency. The average SREP score remained stable at 2.5, and scores were unchanged for most banks. Around 8% of banks improved and 7% deteriorated. Over five years, however, scores have changed for more than half of the banks, showing that our assessments respond to changes in their risk profiles.
Capital requirements also remain broadly stable. Overall Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) requirements and guidance for 2027 stand at 11.3% of risk-weighted assets, compared with 11.2% for 2026. Over the past five years, they have risen from around 10.4%, almost entirely because national authorities raised macroprudential buffers. Our own microprudential requirements have barely moved: Pillar 2 requirements in CET1 have stayed at around 1.1-1.2% throughout, and Pillar 2 guidance is now lower than five years ago.
All banks currently hold capital above their applicable 2027 requirements, buffers and guidance, while the sector’s aggregate CET1 ratio stood at around 16% in the second quarter of 2026. How much banks hold above our requirements is for them to decide. We have clarified in our Guide to the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) that the management buffer reflects a bank’s own view of the capital it needs to keep its business model sustainable. It is not a supervisory requirement. Banks also remain liquid and profitable, and asset quality has shown little deterioration so far despite the difficult geopolitical and macroeconomic environment.
This year, we applied our revised methodology for Pillar 2 requirements for the first time. It links the requirements more closely to banks’ underlying risks and accounts for potential overlaps with Pillar 1 following the final Basel III reforms. Where we identified overlaps, we adjusted Pillar 2 requirements to avoid double-counting.
At the same time, the aggregate picture should not hide persistent weaknesses. Internal governance and operational resilience remain key concerns, particularly risk data aggregation, ICT and cyber resilience, business continuity and third-party risk management. Credit risk management also continues to account for a large share of our qualitative measures. And although overall asset quality remains sound, pockets of vulnerability remain in consumer credit, commercial real estate and lending to energy-intensive or supply-chain-exposed firms.
So the overall message is one of resilience, but not immunity. Banks are navigating this period of heightened uncertainty from a strong position. They need to use that strength to address long-standing weaknesses and remain prepared for risks that may take time to materialise.
In the context of the SREP, how well prepared are supervisors and banks to address both financial risks, such as liquidity risk, and non-financial risks, such as cyber risk? Do you have sufficiently granular data to monitor and measure these risks at bank level? And how do you determine the appropriate supervisory response, including whether capital, liquidity or qualitative measures are best suited to address a particular risk?
We have a strong supervisory framework for assessing both financial and non-financial risks. Through the SREP, we combine regulatory reporting, targeted reviews, on-site inspections and stress tests to assess each bank’s exposures and risk management capabilities. Preparedness nevertheless varies across banks, and supervisory judgement remains essential as risks evolve.
For liquidity risk, we have detailed, standardised information on banks’ funding and liquidity positions. Banks’ aggregate liquidity coverage ratio stood at around 155% in the second quarter of 2026, comfortably above the regulatory minimum. At bank level, we examine funding concentrations, maturity profiles, available collateral and resilience to severe outflows, including in individual currencies. The 2026 geopolitical reverse stress test showed, for example, that some banks need to better capture the interaction between solvency and liquidity pressures.
For cyber risk, incident and loss data are useful, but cannot tell us how a bank would withstand the next attack. We therefore also assess security controls, governance, third-party dependencies and the ability to maintain or restore critical services. The Digital Operational Resilience Act has strengthened our information base through harmonised reporting of major ICT incidents and banks’ arrangements with ICT providers. Our 2024 cyber resilience stress test showed that banks had response and recovery frameworks in place, but it also identified shortcomings requiring further work.
Overall, we have extensive, granular information for bank-level supervision. At the same time, we want to avoid duplicate reporting. Over the past two years, we have reduced the number of data points banks provide for the SREP short-term exercise data by 20% and we work with regulators and other supervisors to streamline reporting requirements, without compromising our ability to identify and monitor risks.
Let me also emphasise that it is not only about how much information is availble or reported, but also about whether it is accurate, complete and available quickly enough primarily for the banks’ own executive and governance bodies to support decisions, especially under stress. Some banks still have weaknesses in aggregating and reporting risk data, affecting the management of both financial and non-financial risks. Addressing these weaknesses remains a supervisory priority.
Our response depends on the nature and severity of the risk, the safeguards already in place and the bank’s progress in addressing deficiencies. Additional capital covers risks not adequately captured by minimum requirements. Liquidity measures may require a bank to hold additional liquid assets so that it can meet payment obligations even during stressed outflows. Qualitative measures remedy weaknesses in controls, governance or risk management. These measures may be complementary: a bank may need capital to cover potential operational losses while also being required to strengthen its cyber controls and recovery capabilities. Capital provides protection against losses, but it does not remove the obligation to fix the underlying weakness.
A draft report on good practices in governance and risk management will be published in early 2027. It will offer banks illustrative examples of approaches that have proven effective in certain institutional contexts, helping them review their own arrangements and identify improvements suited to their circumstances. It is not intended to serve as a basis for supervisory findings or measures.
On the AI capex supercycle, what is your perspective as a supervisor on the financing and banks’ other exposures to it? We also get questions around the circularity of some of these exposures between the different players. How are you monitoring these linkages, as banks’ disclosures in this area are relatively poor?
The AI buildout may deliver substantial productivity gains, but it also comes with large financing needs. From a supervisory perspective, the central question is whether the financing remains sound if revenues develop more slowly than expected. Much of the initial investment has been undertaken by highly profitable technology companies with strong balance sheets. But as the investment cycle draws increasingly on debt and complex financing structures, exposure to potentially disappointing returns is widening.
Banks are connected to this cycle in several ways. They have direct exposures to technology companies involved in the AI supply chain and data centre development, but can also be indirectly exposed via non-bank financial intermediaries, which may be financing data centres through investment vehicles and private credit funds. A bank may therefore finance both a project and a fund investing in it. Banks need to capture these connections across products and business lines, including commitments to provide further financing. Banks’ current exposures are relatively contained but the indirect channel is difficult to estimate given the opacity of many of the funds. Euro area non-banks are also highly exposed, mainly through equity – and given growing interlinkages between banks and non-banks, these indirect exposures need to be considered too.
Circular financing deserves particular attention. A technology company may, for example, invest in an AI developer that uses the funding to purchase computing services from that same company. Such arrangements can have a sound commercial rationale, such as securing access to scarce computing capacity. But they also link valuations, financing and revenues. If end-user demand disappoints, several parts of the chain may come under pressure simultaneously. Banks therefore need to distinguish revenues based on sustainable customer demand from those that depend on continued financing within the network.
Sound underwriting is therefore essential. The risks differ depending on whether a bank is financing land acquisition, construction or an operational data centre. Banks need to assess the full financing cycle, test whether projected revenues and safeguards remain credible under adverse conditions, and reflect the results in their pricing and risk appetite. Given the specific risk characteristics of data centre financing, in 2027 we will carry out targeted on-site inspections on a small number of banks to verify whether origination standards are sound. This will complement the ongoing work by Joint Supervisory Teams.
Full visibility of the risks is difficult to achieve, particularly where financing is indirect, passes through complex private structures or across borders. Better data and information-sharing between authorities is therefore important. Banks themselves need a consolidated view of exposures and commitments across counterparties, products and business lines. They must identify where separate transactions depend on the same firms and cash flows, and assess the consequences if the assumptions underpinning the AI investment cycle prove too optimistic. These indirect contagion channels are also important for us to understand and are something that we will be focusing on in the coming months.
We are seeing diverging paths on regulation across regions, with some relaxation on the leverage ratio in the United States and more expected in other areas. For example, the top six US banks have grown their leverage exposure by USD 2.5-3 trillion in one year alone. How do you see this from the perspective of a European banking supervisor – do you see a competitive threat for European banks in capital-intensive businesses and, if so, how do you plan to address this?
Regulatory differences can affect competition, particularly where European and US banks compete directly. Where leverage requirements constrain activity, lowering them can release capacity for businesses such as repo financing and Treasury market intermediation, influencing pricing and market share. We take these effects seriously, including the impact of competitive pressures on banks’ business models and risk taking.
The exposure figures nevertheless need careful interpretation. Leverage exposure includes assets and off-balance-sheet positions without risk weighting. Its growth can reflect larger securities financing or derivatives positions, which may have very different risk implications. Assessing any competitive disadvantage also requires comparing the full frameworks, including risk-weighted and leverage requirements, buffers and stress testing, and how they apply at group and subsidiary level. Some changes in the United States reduce requirements that previously exceeded international standards. Their practical effect depends on which requirement is binding for a particular bank and activity.
Our response starts with international cooperation. Consistent implementation of agreed Basel standards supports fair competition and financial stability. Where differences materially affect comparable activities, we should examine the evidence in the Basel Committee and other international fora. The leverage ratio and output floor remain important safeguards against the underestimation of risk, and regulatory changes should be assessed by their combined effect on banks’ resilience.
But regulation is only one factor shaping competitiveness. Market scale, business mix and the depth of capital markets also matter. Europe should address these structural constraints and remove unnecessary complexity, rather than respond to regulatory divergence by weakening prudential standards.
Within our supervisory remit, we are making supervision more focused, efficient and predictable through a more targeted SREP, faster capital-related decisions and simpler reporting. We also support simplifying the European capital framework while preserving its overall resilience. The objective is to remove costs and complexity that serve no prudential purpose, while keeping supervisory requirements firmly grounded in banks’ risks.
Talking about global competitiveness, if we take the market cap of the top five US banks at this conference, it is bigger than the market cap of the entire European bank index. Does this matter to you as a supervisor? European banks are sub-scale in market-making and investment banking compared with their US counterparts, does this matter to the supervisor?
Market valuations matter because they affect banks’ ability to raise equity and invest. But market capitalisation is not, in itself, a supervisory objective. It reflects both a bank’s size and investors’ expectations about its future earnings and risks. We assess those signals alongside profitability, capital strength and the sustainability of its business model.
Market valuations for EU banks have recovered dramatically in the last few years. The reforms implemented after the crisis and the work of supervisors were instrumental in restoring resilience and, by doing so, trust in EU banks.
However, a central obstacle for European banks is fragmentation. US banks benefit from a large domestic market and deep capital markets, while European banks operate across national boundaries, legal systems and market infrastructures. These barriers increase costs and limit their ability to achieve scale, diversify and serve clients across borders.
Scale is particularly relevant in investment banking and market-making, where technology, specialist expertise and international client networks require substantial investment. These activities help companies and governments raise funding, reach investors and manage risks. Europe benefits from banks capable of providing these services reliably and competitively.
Making the Single Market in financial services work in practice is therefore essential. That means completing the banking union, including further progress on a European deposit insurance framework, and advancing the savings and investments union to deepen and integrate Europe’s capital markets. Removing barriers to cross-border business would give banks access to a broader client and investor base. Enabling capital and liquidity to move more easily within cross-border banking groups – subject to adeqaute safeguards – would also allow resources to be used more efficiently. These reforms require sustained action by European and national policymakers.
Ultimately, banks’ boards decide where to compete and how to grow. Our role is to assess whether their strategies are credible and supported by adequate capital, governance and risk management. We do not seek scale for its own sake, and we value the diversity of the EU banking sector. We want a resilient banking sector that can reliably provide essential services, including under stress. Greater integration can support both competitiveness and resilience.
What is your view on cross-border mergers within the current set-up, where the lack of fungibility of capital and liquidity across countries is clearly a deterrent and the third pillar of the banking union, namely a common insurance scheme for bank deposits, still remains far from completion?
Sound cross-border mergers can bring benefits: more diversified revenues and risks, economies of scale and greater capacity to invest, all of which support banks’ profitability, competitiveness and resilience. They can also strengthen private risk sharing across countries and reduce dependence on individual national economies. But the lack of capital and liquidity fungibility can weaken their commercial appeal. If a banking group cannot deploy resources efficiently across countries, some of the expected benefits of a merger will remain out of reach.
For groups operating through subsidiaries, requirements at subsidiary level can constrain the allocation of capital and liquidity. Current law allows capital waivers only within the same Member State. Cross-border liquidity waivers are available under certain conditions, but remain little used. Supervisors can use the flexibility available within the current framework, but broader changes require legislation.
Progress also requires addressing the concerns behind these restrictions. “Host countries” need confidence that subsidiaries will receive support from their group in times of stress. European supervision and resolution still coexist with national deposit guarantee schemes. Although deposit protection rules are harmonised, confidence in these schemes may continue to depend on the strength of the national banking system and, ultimately, the sovereign. A common European deposit insurance framework would strengthen confidence in equal protection and reduce incentives to retain resources within national borders.
Greater flexibility must therefore be accompanied by credible and enforceable arrangements for intragroup support, effective recovery and resolution planning, and adequate liquidity in resolution. Authorities and depositors need confidence that resources will be available where they are needed in a crisis. Integration and the necessary safeguards must advance together.
The ECB takes a neutral, consistent and technical approach to consolidation transactions, assessing domestic and cross-border transactions against the same prudential criteria and ensuring a level playing field across the euro area. We examine whether the business case is sustainable, the projected synergies realistic and the integration plan credible, including for IT systems and risk management. We also assess the impact of the transaction on the resulting institution’s ability to comply with prudential requirements on a forward-looking basis. Early engagement with supervisors helps banks understand our expectations, including the relevant implications from a prudential perspective. Sound cross-border transactions can proceed under the current framework, while policymakers work to remove the remaining barriers.
The ECB initiated a broad set of reforms with its “next-level supervision” project. What are the objectives of this project and what changes from this focus on supervisory simplification can we expect to see from a bank investor’s perspective?
The objective is to make supervision more effective, efficient and risk-based. “Next-level supervision” complements the SREP reform by improving how we handle decisions, internal models, stress tests, reporting and on-site inspections as well as by reviewing our supervisory guidance. We are simplifying routine processes, making greater use of technology and freeing up supervisory capacity to focus on complex cases and emerging risks. For investors, I would highlight three practical changes.
First, faster and more predictable decisions. Around 80% of complete applications for own-funds reductions qualify for fast-track processing, with eligible cases typically processed in less than a week. This reduces uncertainty around the execution of banks’ capital plans. We have also introduced an approach that allows banks to implement material changes to internal models much earlier, subject to prudential safeguards (such as internal control checks and floors limiting capital benefits pending an on-site investigation).
Second, clearer supervisory signals. Under the reformed SREP, banks receive decisions around six weeks earlier, which supports their capital and business planning. Decisions now identify the most important risks and required actions more clearly. Follow-up on less severe findings has been simplified, while material weaknesses receive closer attention and stronger intervention where remediation is inadequate. We have also streamlined our published guidance by discontinuing outdated documents and clarifying our expectations.
Third, less unnecessary administrative work. We are reducing duplication in data requests, aligning stress-test templates more closely with existing reporting and making inspections more targeted and better coordinated. Together with the European Banking Authority, we are reducing the number of data points requested for the 2027 EU-wide stress test by around 55%. This should allow banks to devote more resources to managing risks, investing and serving customers.
We will assess how well these changes are working by monitoring processing times, reporting costs and the effectiveness of remediation. Capital and distribution decisions will continue to reflect each bank’s risks and resilience. For investors, the intended result is more predictable supervisory processes, clearer expectations and a stronger basis for assessing banks’ capital plans and sustainable performance.
Geopolitical risk was a supervisory priority for 2026-28, and you also conducted a thematic reverse stress test on geopolitical risks earlier this year. What are the key focus areas here, and what steps are you taking to ensure banks remain vigilant to this risk?
Geopolitical shocks can affect banks through several channels at once. Trade restrictions or energy disruptions can weaken borrowers, market uncertainty can raise funding costs, and cyberattacks can interrupt critical services. Our focus is on whether banks can identify these exposures, understand how they interact and maintain financial and operational resilience under stress.
This year’s reverse stress test examined that preparedness. We asked 110 banks to work backwards from a prescribed depletion of at least 300 basis points in their CET1 ratio and identify plausible geopolitical scenarios that could cause it. They then had to explain how the shock would spread through their business and how management would respond. This exposed vulnerabilities specific to each bank’s business model.
Banks generally developed meaningful scenarios, but the exercise revealed important gaps. Some banks need more granular assessments of affected borrowers, sectors and regions. Others projected limited liquidity stress despite substantial capital depletion, suggesting that they had not fully captured how solvency and funding pressures can reinforce each other, including in foreign currencies. Some management actions also appeared optimistic: selling assets or raising capital may be much harder when many institutions are trying to do the same thing at the same time. Recovery plans therefore need to reflect market capacity and realistic execution times.
Our supervisory teams are following up through ongoing supervisory dialogue and qualitative SREP assessments. We are examining banks’ stress-testing frameworks, capital and liquidity planning and recovery plans. This is complemented by targeted reviews and inspections covering credit underwriting, cybersecurity and reliance on critical service providers. We are also requiring banks to address weaknesses in risk data aggregation, so that management can quickly get an accurate picture of exposures when conditions deteriorate.
Boards have a central responsibility here. They need to challenge a range of severe but plausible scenarios, revisit assumptions as circumstances change and ensure that contingency actions can actually be executed under stress. Scenario analysis should continuously inform business decisions and preparedness. Strong capital and liquidity provide essential protection, but keeping that protection effective also requires reliable information, sound judgement and timely action.
And what about stablecoins and tokenised deposits: how prepared are European banks in your view? The discussion so far seems to be very US-led, with ongoing flexibility and the convergence of DeFi and TradFi, as reflected by recent SEC regulations, for example. Is there a risk of increased dollarisation if the CLARITY Act goes through? Is this a concern from an ECB supervisory perspective considering liquidity movements/mismatches and regulatory supervision?
European banks are actively preparing for tokenised money, although current activity remains limited and largely at the pilot or pre-production stage. Recent supervisory information indicates that around 30% of banks under the ECB’s supervision plan to offer tokenised deposits, while around 20% are considering issuing e-money tokens. So there is a meaningful pipeline, but commercial deployment is still limited.
Several initiatives are moving beyond individual proofs of concept towards solutions involving multiple banks. One example is the Commercial Bank Money Token initiative in Germany, which explores how tokenised deposits can work across banks and platforms. Corporate treasury and cross-border payments are important use cases, with clients seeking faster, programmable payments integrated into their business processes. A tokenised deposit confined to one bank’s closed system is less useful to corporate clients that use several banks. Moving to commercial scale therefore requires a credible business case, interoperability and legal certainty, for example on settlement finality and depositor rights, as well as robust governance and liquidity and operational controls.
The distinction between tokenised deposits and stablecoins is important. Tokenised deposits are still claims on banks. Using distributed ledger technology does not, in itself, change a deposit’s legal character or its treatment under banking regulation and supervision, and tokenised deposits can continue to support bank-based financing of the economy. Their design can nevertheless affect liquidity, operational and legal risks. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has taken the position that tokenised deposits should remain within the existing deposit framework and should not be brought under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) merely because distributed ledger technology is used. Fiat-backed stablecoins, by contrast, typically rely on a pool of reserve assets to meet redemption requests, and their risks need to be assessed separately.
In Europe, MiCAR is already applicable and covers crypto-asset issuance, services and market conduct. In the United States, the GENIUS Act, enacted in July 2025, will apply from 18 January 2027 and is narrower in scope: it establishes a regime for payment stablecoins. The CLARITY Act, which addresses broader crypto-market structure, has passed the House of Representatives but has not passed the Senate.
There is a risk of increased dollarisation. It does not hinge on the CLARITY Act: the US framework for payment stablecoins is the GENIUS Act, and market participants are already preparing for its application. Wider use of dollar-denominated stablecoins in payments and as settlement assets for tokenised securities could strengthen the position of the dollar, potentially reducing the euro’s role in emerging digital markets and increasing Europe’s dependence on non-European issuers and infrastructure. The global stablecoin market, at around USD 300 billion, is overwhelmingly dollar-denominated and highly concentrated in two issuers, Tether and Circle. The scale of the effect will depend on actual adoption and on whether credible euro-denominated alternatives achieve sufficient reach.
From a banking supervision perspective, a key concern is the effect on banks’ funding and liquidity. While the scale is limited today, the composition of funding could nevertheless change. Deposits may migrate to stablecoins and then return to banks as reserves placed by stablecoin issuers. Even if the money remains within the banking system, diversified retail deposits could be transformed into more concentrated and potentially more volatile wholesale funding. Deposits from stablecoin issuers generally attract a 100% outflow assumption under the liquidity coverage ratio, substantially higher than the rate applied to stable retail deposits. ECB staff analysis illustrates how this change in funding composition can reduce liquidity ratios, even when the incoming funds are invested in high-quality liquid assets. If reserve assets are held as bank deposits, widespread redemptions could trigger rapid and concentrated withdrawals from the banks concerned.
Banks should have arrangements in place to address instances of deposit migration, rapid redemptions, funding concentrations and currency mismatches in their stress tests and contingency funding plans. They must also understand risks arising through custody, payment services and relationships with stablecoin issuers and other crypto-asset firms. Around-the-clock token markets could generate liquidity needs when conventional funding markets are closed. Where the same stablecoin is issued both inside and outside the EU, holders may seek to redeem in the EU, and the reserves held here may not be sufficient to meet those claims. The ESCB has called for legislative clarification of whether such multi-issuer arrangements may operate under MiCAR. Any framework permitting them would need binding safeguards on redemption rights, the availability and transferability of reserves, and cooperation between authorities.
Europe needs credible euro-denominated solutions and infrastructure that allows them to work across banks and platforms. The objective is to meet European companies’ payment and settlement needs while preserving the singleness of money – the assurance that one euro remains one euro across different forms of money. Central bank money provides the settlement anchor, alongside regulated private solutions such as tokenised deposits and appropriately designed euro-denominated stablecoins. Since September, Pontes has enabled wholesale transactions in tokenised assets to be settled in central bank money. And through Appia, the Eurosystem is working with the market on the architecture, standards and governance for an integrated European tokenised financial ecosystem.
For supervisors, the approach remains technology-neutral. We should enable banks to address legitimate corporate demand and innovate responsibly, while ensuring that the same activities and risks receive consistent regulatory and supervisory treatment.
Somewhat related to the previous question, how can you prepare for a scenario in which US firms move further ahead with agentic AI? It raises questions around liquidity risk, as it will become easier for customers to move their deposits around. Are current liquidity regulations fit for the changing landscape? In particular, are you concerned that European retail-oriented banks – especially in southern Europe and Germany – generate most of their profits through liability-driven spreads rather than loans?
The March 2023 banking turmoil showed how a closely connected client base can respond to a loss of confidence with rapid withdrawals through digital banking. Agentic AI could take this further by automating the search for alternatives and the movement of funds within a customer’s mandate. This could improve competition and cash management, but could also produce more herding in terms of outflows if many agents respond to similar information or incentives.
Adoption remains at an early stage. European evidence so far suggests that online banking can amplify extreme outflows under stress, but has not generally increased deposit volatility in normal times. We should preserve that distinction while preparing for further change. Banks should also consider how agentic services offered by large technology and payment firms could reshape the customer relationship, and be mindful of their increasing dependence on external providers.
The liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio remain essential foundations, but they need to be complemented by bank-specific stress tests, intraday monitoring and credible contingency funding plans. Any recalibration of regulatory outflow assumptions should be evidence-based. The Basel Committee is examining the performance of the liquidity framework following the 2023 turmoil and possible further measures.
Our existing supervision of funding plans, deposit modelling and liquidity management provides a basis for assessing these developments. Banks need to understand differences within their depositor base, including insurance coverage, concentration, rate sensitivity and reliance on digital platforms. Their stress tests should capture faster and more correlated withdrawals, including outside normal business hours. They also need tested arrangements to mobilise collateral and obtain funding quickly.
On profitability, a strong deposit franchise remains a valuable source of earnings and stable funding. The risk is excessive reliance on deposits remaining cheap and insensitive to competing offers. A bank may retain its deposits by paying more for them and still suffer a significant decline in earnings. We assess this exposure on a bank-by-bank basis, considering the customer base, asset structure, hedging and broader business model. Broad geographical comparisons can conceal substantial differences.
Banks therefore need realistic assumptions about deposit pricing, retention and funding costs as well as business models that remain viable if liability margins compress. Our focus is on whether their liquidity and earnings remain resilient as competition intensifies, and whether pressure on margins encourages excessive risk taking.
Banca centrale europea
Direzione Generale Comunicazione
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- +49 69 1344 7455
- media@ecb.europa.eu
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