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Claudia Buch
Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB
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Introductory statement

Speech by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the press conference on the 2026 SREP results and the supervisory priorities for 2027-29

Frankfurt am Main, 19 November 2026

Thank you for joining us for this year’s press conference summarising the results of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) and presenting our strategic priorities for the next three years.

The SREP results show that the euro area banking sector remains broadly resilient. The average SREP score remains stable, as do capital requirements. The sector is well capitalised, liquid and profitable (Slide 2). Banks return around half of these profits to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks. Despite the geopolitical risks that have already materialised, banks’ asset quality has so far shown little deterioration.

But resilience does not mean immunity (Slide 3). Banks remain vulnerable to the heightened risks to financial stability that the ECB highlighted yesterday in its Financial Stability Review.

Safeguarding banks’ resilience is thus essential.

Operational resilience remains a key area of attention. New technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) can improve the provision of financial services. But their adoption creates new vulnerabilities related to outsourcing or cyberattacks. Banks thus need to ensure strong risk management and sufficient investment in the safety of their operations.

In order to continue servicing the economy and safeguarding resilience in a challenging environment, banks need to remediate open supervisory findings. To support this, we have implemented a comprehensive reform programme, making our supervision more efficient, more effective and more risk-based.

Let me now turn to the results of this year’s assessment.

SREP results show a broadly stable banking sector

For the majority of banks, the SREP score was unchanged from last year, with an average score of 2.5 (Slide 4). Generally, SREP scores reflect banks’ exposure to risks and the effectiveness of their risk controls. For around 8% of banks, scores improved; for 7%, scores worsened.

Over a five-year period, changes have been more widespread, with SREP scores changing for more than half of the banks (Slide 5).

Breaking down the scores into their components reveals two main areas of concern (Slide 6).

The first is internal governance and operational resilience. Weaknesses related to cyber resilience, IT systems and third-party risk management persist.

The second area is credit risk. The largest share of qualitative supervisory measures remains related to weaknesses in how some banks identify, assess and manage credit risk.

Our supervisory priorities, which I will describe shortly, address these weaknesses.

But let me first turn to capital requirements (Slide 7).

Reflecting the stability of the scores, overall Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirements and guidance for 2027 will remain broadly stable at 11.3% of risk-weighted assets, compared with 11.2% for 2026.[1]

The key quantitative outcome of the SREP is the Pillar 2 capital requirement. For the sector as a whole, the Pillar 2 requirement (P2R) to be met with CET1 capital remains largely stable at 1.2%.

This year, we applied a new methodology to determine the P2R (Slide 8). It links capital requirements more closely to underlying risks and improves the way we check for overlaps between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 capital requirements on a case-by-case basis.

With the implementation of the Basel III rules in Europe, some risks previously covered by Pillar 2, particularly in the areas of credit and operational risk, may now be reflected in Pillar 1 requirements.[2] This could lead to an increase in risks reflected in Pillar 1 and thus higher capital requirements.

However, for around two-thirds of the banks, Pillar 1 requirements remained stable or fell following the implementation of Basel III (Slide 9). For these banks, there were no Pillar 2 adjustments to address potential overlaps.

For around one-third of the banks, the amount of capital required under Pillar 1 increased (Slide 10). For these banks, there were modest reductions in Pillar 2 requirements where overlaps had been identified.

All banks currently have capital levels above the requirements, buffers and guidance applicable in 2027 (Slide 11). The banking sector’s CET1 ratio stood at around 16% in the second quarter of 2026,[3] providing an important buffer against potential shocks.

The leverage ratio safeguards against excessive leverage, complementing risk-weighted capital requirements (Slide 12). Across all banks, the leverage ratio stood at 5.8% of banks’ total exposures in the second quarter of 2026 and therefore above the 3% minimum requirement.[4] For global systemically important banks, the leverage ratio stood at 4.7%.

Over time, the composition of the capital stack has changed towards macroprudential buffers (Slide 13). Macroprudential buffers apply to all banks and address risks to financial stability. Some of these buffers can be released when risks to financial stability materialise. This helps to stabilise the supply of credit in periods of stress.

At the current juncture, capital requirements are not constraining the supply of bank credit. Banks themselves report that tighter credit standards primarily reflect their assessment of risks and uncertainty about the economic outlook, rather than their capital positions.[5]

Safeguarding banks’ resilience in an environment characterised by heightened risks to financial stability

Our first main supervisory priority for the coming three years focuses on strengthening banks’ financial resilience to geopolitical risks and macro-financial shocks (Slide 14).

In our priorities, we address relevant sources of financial stability risk: an abrupt repricing in financial markets, potentially triggered by a reassessment of expectations surrounding AI; sovereign vulnerabilities amid rising financing costs and fiscal pressures; and an amplification of shocks owing to close interlinkages between banks and non-banks.[6]

As regards geopolitical risks, it is still too early to see their full effects on banks’ balance sheets, as deteriorating economic conditions typically take time to translate into weaker asset quality.[7] As part of our priorities, we will thus scrutinise banks’ capital planning, in particular their preparedness for adverse scenarios, and the consistent implementation of the new requirements stemming from the revised Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR III).

So far, the rather severe macroeconomic shocks of recent years – related to the pandemic and the energy crisis – have not led to a broad-based deterioration of credit quality (Slide 15). Even during recessions and periods of weak economic growth, banks’ risk weights have declined. One reason is the overall resilience of the economy: fiscal policy has kept up aggregate demand, and households and firms have had relatively strong balance sheets. AI-related activities and investments have supported global growth.

But future shocks may have a stronger impact on banks, not least because policy space to buffer shocks has become more limited.

Against this background, the role of the Basel III output floor as a safeguard against the underestimation of risks should not be weakened. It limits how far risk-weighted assets calculated using internal models can fall below those calculated using the standardised approach.

Pockets of vulnerability are already emerging. Non-performing loans (NPL) are at low levels, although modest increases have been recorded in former low-NPL countries (Slide 16).

Credit quality has deteriorated in the consumer credit segment as well as in lending to corporate borrowers in energy-intensive sectors and sectors facing supply chain disruptions. Mortgages related to commercial real estate remain exposed to refinancing risks.

To support sound, forward-looking risk management, we will therefore pay particular attention to prudent lending standards and sound credit risk management.

The reverse stress test we conducted earlier this year assessed banks’ preparedness for unexpected geopolitical events. Banks were asked to formulate risk scenarios reflecting vulnerabilities in their business models that would lead to a capital depletion of 300 basis points. Most banks demonstrated a sound understanding of how geopolitical risks could affect their business.

However, areas for attention remain. Some banks underestimated how solvency and liquidity problems can be interlinked. Some of the mitigating actions envisaged by banks, such as raising capital, may not be readily available in a crisis, especially if many institutions try to take similar actions at the same time.

The impact of pressure on sovereign bond markets on banks remains contained at present. But because banks hold government bonds for liquidity and collateral management, they need to carefully manage concentration and liquidity risks. We are closely monitoring these risks as well. Generally, the bank-sovereign nexus has weakened since the euro area sovereign debt crisis, thanks to stronger bank balance sheets and institutional reforms.[8]

In addition, banks’ exposures to emerging vulnerabilities related to private credit markets and the financing of AI-related activities require monitoring and good risk management. Euro area banks’ direct exposures are relatively small. But banks can be indirectly affected through their non-bank counterparts and general swings in market conditions. As regards the financing of AI data centres, we are stepping up our supervisory scrutiny to ensure that banks maintain prudent lending standards and manage the associated credit risks effectively.

Finally, more frequent and severe extreme weather events and uncertainty surrounding the transition to a low-carbon economy are creating risks for the economy and banks. We will therefore continue to follow up on persistent shortcomings in the management of climate and nature-related risks.

Addressing shortcomings in governance and operational resilience

Geopolitical risks and the rapid digitalisation of financial services require strong operational resilience and risk management, our second main priority (Slide 17). Virtually all banks under our supervision use AI tools, while around one-third are considering the tokenisation of deposits.

Yet weaknesses in risk management and governance remain common findings in the SREP. Around a quarter of qualitative measures are related to internal governance, with operational risk accounting for 12% of all measures.

Deficiencies in banks’ ability to collect and generate reliable information about their risks are a case in point.[9] Some banks have persistent weaknesses in this area. This can have negative implications for risk assessments and the ability of boards to respond to emerging risks. Strengthening risk data aggregation and risk reporting therefore remains a supervisory priority.

Banks need to address operational risk related to weaknesses in ICT security, cyber resilience and third-party risk management. Banks’ growing reliance on a limited number of critical ICT providers creates vulnerabilities. Under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), banks need to enhance their ability to prevent, withstand and recover from disruptions to critical services. Around 40% of incidents reported under DORA originate from third-party providers. Nearly a quarter of the qualitative measures we issued on operational and ICT risks concern weaknesses in business continuity arrangements.

Advances in artificial intelligence are a key area of attention. On the one hand, AI can improve the way in which banks provide financial services and enhance efficiency.[10] On the other hand, advanced AI models are making cyberattacks faster and more sophisticated.

Supervision has an important role to play in assessing vulnerabilities, sharing good practices across the industry and providing consistent oversight.

Therefore, in July this year, we asked the CEOs of significant banks to develop action plans for addressing AI-enabled cybersecurity threats. We are now reviewing the plans, which had to be submitted by the end of October, and we will share good practices with the industry.

More targeted and risk-based supervision under the reformed SREP

In a challenging risk environment, it is not just banks that need to adjust. Supervision must do so as well. That is why a few years ago we launched a comprehensive reform of the way we conduct supervision.[11]

The reformed SREP has led to tangible improvements (Slide 18).

First, we are faster and more efficient. We communicate SREP outcomes up to two months earlier than before the reforms. Approvals of capital-related measures or securitisations are granted much more quickly – taking around a week rather than several months as in the past. Needless to say, approvals are not granted if this would weaken prudential standards. We closely monitor banks’ use of securitisation and the associated bank-level and aggregate effects on stability.

Second, we are further enhancing the effectiveness and risk focus of our supervision. For supervisory findings and measures, we use a tiered approach.

If findings are less severe, we leave the follow-up largely to the banks.

If findings are more severe, we strengthen our monitoring and escalate supervisory measures to ensure that banks address them in a timely manner.

The more severe the deficiencies, the more intense our follow-up. In line with this risk-based approach, the number of new qualitative SREP measures is half that of last year. Qualitative measures were issued to 78 banks this year, 22 fewer than in 2025.

The tiered approach applies to all supervisory measures, including those originating from on-site inspections or internal model investigations.[12] It also applies to the stock of open findings. We are currently closing outdated, low-severity and prudentially less relevant items. This allows banks and supervisors to focus their attention on material concerns that require remediation.

Conclusion

The 2026 SREP results show that the euro area banking sector remains broadly resilient (Slide 19). Overall scores and capital requirements are stable. The sector’s capital ratios remain above applicable capital requirements, buffers and guidance.

At the same time, weaknesses in governance, operational resilience and credit risk management require continued attention, and open findings need to be remediated. In an increasingly digital environment, banks’ competitiveness and resilience are shaped by sound, long-term digitalisation strategies.

The banking sector’s resilience does not make it immune to shocks. Banks need to be able to respond to unexpected events, higher losses or operational disruptions. This will allow them to lend, take risks and serve the economy even in more challenging times. Resilience and competitiveness are two sides of the same coin.

The European Commission’s communication on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector provides an opportunity to implement a reform package that further promotes the integration of European banking markets and streamlines the European regulatory framework. Strong regulatory guardrails, anchored in global standards set by the Basel Committee, support continued trust in the stability of European banks. An effective supervisory framework must also preserve the tools supervisors need to address evolving risks, so that we can deliver on our mandate in an efficient, effective and risk-based way.

Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

  1. This overall figure includes the common Pillar 1 minimum requirements, bank-specific Pillar 2 requirements, macroprudential buffers addressing system-wide risks and Pillar 2 guidance. Overall capital requirements and guidance applicable in 2027 in terms of total capital also remained broadly stable at 15.7% of risk-weighted assets, compared with 15.6% in 2026, and total capital Pillar 2 requirements continued to stand at around 2%. Total capital differs from CET1 capital in that it also includes Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.

  2. In the EU, the final Basel III reforms are implemented through the revised Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR III) and Capital Requirements Directive (CRD VI). CRR III generally began to apply on 1 January 2025, subject to transitional arrangements.

  3. This number is the weighted average across banks under ECB supervision.

  4. The fully phased-in leverage ratio is calculated using Tier 1 capital and total exposures determined without the benefit of applicable transitional arrangements, thereby reflecting the capital rules as they will apply once these arrangements have expired.

  5. See Section 2.1 and Table 1 in ECB (2026), The euro area bank lending survey – Third quarter of 2026, 27 October.

  6. See ECB (2026), Financial Stability Review, 18 November, and ECB (2026), Supervisory priorities 2027-29, 19 November.

  7. See Box 5 “The effects of oil supply shocks on corporate resilience, bank asset quality and lending” in ECB (2026), Financial Stability Review, 18 November.

  8. Buch, Claudia (2026), “The bank-sovereign nexus: securing progress by completing the banking union”, speech at the AFME European Financial Integration Conference 2026, Frankfurt am Main, 19 May.

  9. See the ECB’s Guide on effective risk data aggregation and risk reporting.

  10. See Elderson, Frank (2026), “Strengthening operational resilience for the age of AI”, keynote speech at the Goldman Sachs European Financials Conference 2026, Zurich, 3 June, and Buch, Claudia (2026), “Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament”, introductory statement, Brussels, 2 July.

  11. See Dahlgren, Sarah, Himino, Ryozo, Restoy, Fernando and Rogers, Carolyn (2023), Assessment of the European Central Bank’s Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process – report by the Expert Group to the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, 17 April, and ECB (2025), Streamlining supervision, safeguarding resilience: the ECB’s agenda for more effective, efficient and risk-based European banking supervision, December.

  12. Elderson, Frank (2026), “Effective supervision through timely remediation”, contribution to the panel discussion “Effective Supervision and Enforcement” at the 17th FMA Supervisory Conference, Vienna, 6 October.

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Annexes
19 November 2026