

Template for comments

Guide on the management and disclosure of climate-related and environmental risks

Institution/Company

German Banking Industry Committee (GBIC)

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General comments

The German Banking Industry Committee (GBIC) welcomes the ECB's commitment to closely follow international and European developments in the field of sustainable finance and to support the financial sector on its path towards a sustainable economy. We believe .that coping this issue is an important priority for the future direction of the credit institutions

We welcome the fact that, instead of establishing binding policies for institutions in regard of their approach to climate-related and environmental risks, the ECB's Guide merely formulates supervisory expectations. It should be stated more clearly that the Guide primarily serves, or is intended to serve, as a basis for the supervisory dialogue between the Joint Supervisory Team (JST) and the respective , institution. The approach institutions take in regard of climate-related and environmental risks varies significantly according to size business model, complexity and geographic location. The expectations formulated by the ECB, particularly in respect of the quantification of climate-related and environmental risks and systematic IT-based data collection and aggregation, may provide a longer-term vision or guidance regarding the standards the institutions will have to meet in the future. This aspect should be clarified in the Guide by allowing the institutions greater leeway in their development of suitable methods and processes, etc. Moreover, there is as yet a lack of data and/or recognised methods when it comes to climate-related and environmental risks. The Guide should moderate the expectations in this respect and take respective opt-out clauses (e.g. "where appropriate and possible") into account

Given the complexity of climate-related and environmental risks and the current lack of development of industry standards for their .assessment, we consider the ECB's approach of launching a discussion paper to start the dialogue with the institutions to be appropriate One of the main standards in the risk management field is the identification of material risks, including any concentration within and between those risks at the institution level, in the context of a risk inventory. Scores of European policies relate to the management of institutions' material risks. The Guide also explains at various points that the institutions should assess the materiality of the climate-related and environmental risks. In this context, climate-related and environmental aspects impact the risk drivers and affect the materiality of the risk types (no separate risk type). We therefore ask that the term "risk driver" be used consistently throughout the Guide and that no other terms be used. The assessment of the materiality of risk drivers is not a standard practice and does not seem appropriate in view of the

Template for comments

Guide on the management and disclosure of climate-related and environmental risks

Please enter all your feedback in this list.

When entering feedback, please make sure that:

- each comment deals with a single issue only;
- you indicate the relevant article/chapter/paragraph, where appropriate;
- you indicate whether your comment is a proposed amendment, clarification or deletion.

Deadline: 25 September 2020

| ID | Ch | apter | | Expectation or box number | | Type of comment | Detailed comment | Concise statement as to why your comment should be taken on board | Name of commenter | Personal data |
|----|------|---------|-----|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|----------------------|---------------|
| | 1 Ch | apter 2 | 2.1 | | 7 | Clarification | We welcome the fact that the ECB has placed its publication in the broader context of the numerous existing regulations issued by various standard setters at the international and the European level. Although the Guide's introduction states that the expectations are "not binding", a disclosure requirement in the case of deviations could be inferred from the wording in paragraph 2.2. In numerous places, reference is made to existing policies, guidelines or regulations which have been binding for a considerable time. The examples of observed practice per se are not part of the expectations. We rather regard the examples of observed practice as a list of possible approaches to implementation, and hence as examples of good practice or guidance. In no case a kind of minimum standard or best practice should be derived from it. | | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 2 | Chapter 2 | 2.2 | 8 | Amendment | In our opinion, the scheduled date of application is too short term since the consultation period does not end before 25 September 2020 and it may be assumed that the draft Guide will be amended in the context of the consultation. We believe that, instead of submitting detailed GAP analyses, banks should notify the ECB of the progress they have made in the development of their climate-related and environmental risk framework and thus describe the steps they have taken towards implementation. Moreover, there is no particular urgency since the last ECB risk assessment (risk constellation in the SSM, period 2020 to 2022) classified the impact and probability of occurrence of risks arising through climate change as low (on the grounds that their relevance is higher over the longer term; cf. SSM Risk Map dated 7 Oct. 2019). According to the rationale of the Guide (Chapter 2.1: Application to significant institutions), the institutions are encouraged to duly consider other relevant publications in their implementation of the Guide. Relevant publications include the final EBA Guidelines on Loan Origination and Monitoring of 29 May 2020 which include explicit policies regarding the handling of ESG risks. The institutions should be granted a sufficient transitional period to allow them to implement of all of the measures. The Europene Commission will publish delegated acts or RTS on the legislative packages of the Commission action plan on 30 December 2020 respectively 30 June 2021 (in particular on the EU Taxonomy Regulation, EU Disclosure Regulation and MIITD II). Therefore, the mandates the EBA will deliver in the context of CRR II and CRD V in regard of Pillars II (SREP) and III (Disclosure) should be avaited first. The EBA contents solve significant requirements. Furthermore, the mandates the EBA will deliver in the context of CRR II and CRD V in regard of Pillars II (SREP) and III (Disclosure) should be avaited first. The EBA contents solve significant overlaps with the contents of the ECB Dratt Guide on Climate-R | Problem of time and policy content of other standard setters | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|---|-----------|-----|---|-----------|--|---|--------------------|---------|
| 3 | Chapter 2 | 2.3 | 8 | Deletion | institutions. In contrast to the ECB Guide, due to potential negative spill-over effects on less significant institutions, the BaFin | Discrepancy with the policy content of other standard setters and relevance of the proportionality approach | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 4 | Chapter 3 | 3.1 / 3.2 | 10 | Clarification | In general, we would like to point out that there is significant variation in the dynamics of climate-related and other environmental risks as well as the associated models, data analyses and narratives. From a methodological point of view, they cannot simply be covered in the same way. Thanks to the concentrated research conducted in the field of climate change, science is undoubtedly most advanced in this area. At present, initial narratives are forming on the basis of this scientific research which also facilitate a comprehensive approach by the institutions. However, this is not yet true for the other environmental risks. Hence, it should be possible to address individual risk drivers at different levels of thoroughness depending on the respective scientific and methodological progress. The ECB refers to separate liability risks that may arise from climate-related and environmental risks. This could result in unnecessary complexity in the institutions' risk inventories, which already include legal risks, conduct risks and compliance risks. The introduction of additional liability risks appears to be of little benefit. | Lack of policy detail and/or discrepancy with the policy content of other standard setters | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|---|-----------|-----------|----|---------------|---|---|--------------------|---------|
| 5 | Chapter 3 | 3.1 / 3.2 | 10 | | As yet, the Draft Guide fails to consistently distinguish between the concepts of risk perspective and impact perspective. Since sensitive credit exposures do not necessarily have to be critical from both a risk and an impact perspective (e.g. loans granted to a company that manufactures EU taxonomy compliant products but has its production site in a flood-prone location), we are concerned that the implementation of the examples of observed practice falls short. Further clarification of the policies would be welcome. | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 6 Chap | oter 4 | 4.1 | Expectation 1 | 16 | Deletion | In the context of their risk inventories, institutions already assess the materiality of the risks in existing risk categories, ensuring that materiality is included in the respective reporting and strategic processes. However, without consideration of the materiality of these risks for individual institutions, we reject an audit assessments in the sense of formalised compliance checks. We are also of the opinion that the recommendation to monitor appropriate energy efficiency standards in real estate portfolios goes too far. What does "taking up-to-data scientific insights into account" mean? Does this involve extensive regular analysis of the current state of scientific insights (if so, which one?)? The term "materiality" is used in the context of assessments of risk types (e.g. counterparty risk) and their underlying parameters (e.g. PD, LGD). By contrast, a separate assessment of the materiality of risk drivers is not standard practice and appears to be unreasonable. In our opinion, the note referring to the monitoring of energy efficiency standards in individual jurisdictions and their impact on real estate portfolios also goes too far. Moreover, the respective source mentioned in Footnote 30 refers to the potential impact of tougher energy efficiency standards on financial risks rather than their supervisory impact. The Guide states at various points that the institutions are expected to assess the materiality of the environmental and climate-related risks. As we understand it, climate-related and environmental risks are considered to be risk drivers that have an impact on respective risk types (for instance credit risk, operational risk, market risk) and hence do not constitute a separate risk type. However, we are of the opinion that it is not sufficiently clear under which conditions key figures such as KRIs and risk data should be determined and pricing adjustments made. A determination of climate-related and environmental risks on as KRIs and risk data should be determined and pricing adjustments mad | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 7 | Chapter 4 | 4.1 | Expectation 1.1 | 16 | Clarification | As stated in the document, the EBA requires banks to scan the business environment capturing a broad range of external factors and trends that shape the business conditions in which an institution operates. These include macroeconomic variables, the competitive landscape, policy and regulation, technology, societal/demographic developments, and geopolitical trends. Climate- related and environmental risks are not separate risks but may influence all of these areas. Hence it would make no sense to analyse such risks separately and in isolation. Moreover, this would not fit into the existing framework. It would be preferable if climate and environmental risks were highlighted during the analysis of the above-mentioned dimensions (if relevant). Furthermore, this analysis should rather focus on external factors instead of "at the level of key sectors, geographies and related to products and services they are active in". Rewording suggestion: When scanning their business environment, institutions are expected to identify the effect of risks arising from climate change and environmental degradation on external factors and trends that shape their business conditions (if relevant). | Wording in the Guide not consistent with current risk management standards | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|---|-----------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|---|---|--------------------|---------|
| 8 | Chapter 4 | 4.1 | Expectation 1.2 | 17 | Clarification | Due to the fact that strategic horizons are long-term and that the effects of climate and environmental risks are also long-term ,as well, and difficult to break-down on a yearly basis, it would make more sense to have only two time dimensions: 1. short to medium 2. long-term. Rewording suggestion: Institutions are expected to understand how climate-related and environmental risks affect their business environment in the short to medium term and in the long term to inform their business strategy process. It is our understanding of the requirement in interaction with the scenario analyses as set out in Expectation 1.2 that the management body's engagement with the results and guidance relating to stress tests may be sufficient. We ask for further clarification of this point. | Due to the long-time horizon, policies should be staggered into two large time blocks. | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| ç | Chapter 4 | 4.2 | | 17 | Clarification | We support the call for institutions to integrate short, medium and long-term climate-related and environmental risks into their business strategies, employing tools such as stress tests and scenario analysis. Nevertheless, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the envisaged course of action will require a respective development and transition period. The performance of scenario analysis and stress tests is still new to competitors and the market. At present, initial empirical findings are being collected and different tools and procedures tested. Moreover, as we understand it, a quality database and the respective IT support are still outstanding; both the availability and the quality of environmental and climate-related data still pose a significant challenge for the financial sector. The implementation per se will also take considerable time. Realistically speaking, any business strategy adjustments resulting from the findings of the tests and analyses can only be carried out after the fact. We therefore ask the ECB to take this time horizon into account. | Implementation not possible within the envisaged time horizon | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|----|-----------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|---|--|--------------------|---------|
| 10 | Chapter 4 | 4.2 | Expectation 2.1 | 18 | Clarification | The employment of scenario analysis over various time horizons for inclusion in the business strategy should be based on the extent to which the business model is affected by the climate-related and environmental risks and the resulting findings and guidance should be referred to. We ask for clarification of this point. | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 11 CI | hapter 4 | 4.2 | Expectation 2.2 | 19 | Clarification | In our view, the example of observed practice in the Draft Guide focuses exclusively on KPIs relevant to the impact perspective. Although the KPIs allow for conclusions to be drawn on the climate harmfulness or friendliness of the business activities, they do not provide any information on the risk content of the exposures. In this instance, business strategy aspects and risk strategy aspects are being mixed up. At this point, KRIs relevant to the risk perspective should be supplemented. Insofar as climate-related and environmental aspects are drivers that lead to the risk type being classified as material, they may need to be monitored with the help of KRIs (key risk indicators). Where aspects such as comparability do not play an important role and KPIs are to be selected solely on the basis of the strategic orientation, the ECB should explicitly state this again. The reference to "fully informed decisions on risk-taking" in the context of the definition and monitoring of KPIs may be misleading, not least because "information gaps" cannot be avoided in risk management estimates or projections. We ask the ECB to add KRIs relevant to the risk perspective. This distinction should be made since not every "green" investment is less risky than a "brown" one. For instance, transition risks vary from sector to sector, irrespective of the inspact- relevant KPIs. A steering effect on the risk in respect of ILAAP or ILAAP is therefore not automatically evident for the institution. Moreover, it would be helpful to know which key indicators the ECB considers to be particularly relevant both from an impact and a risk perspective (not least in terms of comparability). | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|-------|----------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|---|---|--------------------|---------|
| 12 CI | hapter 5 | 5.1 | Expectation 3.1 | 21 | Deletion | The establishment of any additional committees other than those pursuant to CRD or the EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance is at the sole discretion of the institution and is clearly guided by the principle of proportionality. The risk committee is responsible for the oversight and implementation of the institution's risk strategy as a matter of principle. | Interaction with other standard setters and relevance of the proportionality approach | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
| 13 CI | hapter 5 | 5.1 | Expectation 3.2 | 22 | Amendment | We also consider the recommendation that the management body should explicitly consider the institution's response to various international or national agreements at the political or economic level to be non-binding. In our opinion, the expectation of any specific monitoring and extensive analysis of the above-mentioned KPIs and KRIs in respect of climate-related and environmental risks goes too far. We also consider the envisaged special status of these risks to be unjustified and, in line with its character, it should also be considered as a possible risk driver of established risk types, not least in regard of the role played by the supervisory board or governing board in their oversight of the management. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 14 Chapte | er 5 5. | 2 | Expectation 4.2 | 23 | Clarification | The text in Expectation 3.3 (managing body) and Expectation 4.2 (risk appetite) refers both to so-called Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). However, no clear distinction is made between the two types of indicators. The difference should be clearly defined and the terms should be properly distinguished from each other. Pursuant to Expectation 4, "institutions are expected to explicitly include climate-related and environmental risks in their risk appetite framework". In order to have a steering effect and to be feasible at the management level, any risk appetite statement should be brief and succinct. The Expectation should therefore be reworded such that the brief statement on risk appetite should be based on a thorough description of the risks. The explanations to Expectation 4.2 also contain the requirement that the "risk appetite agreements and boundaries are decided before commercial targets". However, at the institutes, it is standard practice that the order is reversed, i.e. the commercial targets are set first, or at least at the same time. The sentence creates confusion and should be deleted. At the moment, at least, we believe that the Draft's mandatory future expectation of a quantification of risk indicators and limits is not suitable for all significant institutions due to a lack of uniform assessment definitions, data and models. This expectation 5.4 of the Draft Guide and elsewhere). Separate quantification is therefore virulally impossible and also unreasonable. We expect clarification of the relevance aspect and more transparency in the sense of greater openness to qualitative approaches. On top of this, in the overall consideration of possible ESG effects, it does not seem conductive to restrict management to the climate-related and environmental aspect. In our view, the only sensible approach is economic management that takes into account all risk drivers are currently being developed but may not yet be available for large portions of the portfolio caragragraph 4 | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|-----------|---------|---|-----------------|----|---------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
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| 15 | i Chapter 5 | 5.3 | Expectation 5 | 26 | Clarification | We consider it inappropriate to duplicate the general risk management requirements of the EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance in respect of climate-related and environmental risks. This creates redundancies and increases the complexity of the regulatory framework. For instance, there is no added value to be expected from managing bodies allocating separate roles and responsibilities for climate-related risks (Exp. 3.1). If the climate-related risk is a risk driver for omain institution, the general rule would ensure that roles and responsibilities are allocated appropriately. We would therefore commend streamlining the entire Guide to a significant extent and focus more on the requirements where the climate-related and environmental risks differ from the known prudential risk types. Therefore, Chapter 5.3 could be deleted line to their significant redundancy with the EBA Guidelines. In specific, the reference to the three lines of defence model should be deleted. In its governance and loan origination guidelines, EBA has done without any concrete references or attributions to the three lines of defence model. We also require further clarification in respect of the performance of climate-related and environmental risk assessments at the level of the individual borrower, i.e. what aspects such assessment involves at the start of the business relationship and throughout and which role it should play in the lending process. The term "due diligence" should not be used in the Guide. It does not appear in the EBA Guidelines on Loan Origination and Monitoring. The term could be misinterpreted as meaning that a highly detailed assessment should be carried out for each individual borrower. The proportionality principle should also apply at the transaction level, i.e. less stringent requirements should apply to smaller loans (e.g. retail). According to Expectation 5.3, the first line of defence is expected to identify, assess and monitor any climate-related and environmental risks, recording to Expectati | Guide should be streamlined and redundancies eliminated | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|----|-------------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|--|--|--------------------|---------|
| 16 | Chapter 5 | 5.3 | Expectation 5.5 | 27 | Amendment | The extensive monitoring and assessment tasks relating to sustainability risks lead to unnecessary ambiguities and legal uncertainties, e.g. the question why the approach to climate-related and environmental risks should, or must, affect the entire business organisation. The identification and management of material risks is essentially the responsibility of the risk management function. A binding assignment of the compliance activities is, in our opinion, neither appropriate nor technically feasible - especially in medium-sized or smaller institutes. | Inappropriate level of policy detail and relevance of the proportionality approach | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 1 | 7 Chapter 5 | 5. | 4 | Expectation 6.2 | 29 | Amendment | Given the lack of data and the required work on the IT systems and data sources, if no transition period for implementation is granted, the application of the ECB Guide in prudential dialogues as of late 2020 appears entirely unrealistic. Expectation 6.1 should refer to KRIs (not KPIs). We would welcome the inclusion in the final ECB Guide of an example of observed practice for Expectations 6.2 and 6.3 that demonstrates which data in which type of report the ECB would consider suitable for reporting on climate-related and environmental risks. | Problem of time and lack of policy details | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|---|-------------|----|---|-----------------|----|-----------|---|---|--------------------|---------|
| 1 | 8 Chapter 5 | 5. | 4 | Expectation 6.4 | 30 | Amendment | We consider up-to-date reporting and aggregated risk data beyond the risk types that are classified as material in the risk inventory at the group level and are included in any case to be too far-reaching since climate-related and environmental risks have a cross-sectional impact as a driver for all of these risks. As regards the requirement of ad hoc reporting (6.4), it should be taken into account that this will require changes to IT systems that will require a certain amount of time, and that this process is unlikely to be completed in the course of 2021 due to the necessary release and test cycles in the IT systems. However, if the requirement is still retained in the final version of the ECB Guide, we would welcome the inclusion of an example of observed practice that demonstrates which data in which type of report the ECB would consider suitable for reporting on climate-related and environmental risks. Pursuant to Expectation 6, "for purposes of internal reporting, institutions are expected to report aggregated risk data that reflect their exposures to climate-related and environmental risks. Since climate-related and environmental risks were integrated into the reporting on the individual risks. This should be expressly reiterated at this point of the Guide. | Inappropriate level of policy detail and additional example of implementation | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
| 1 | 9 Chapter 6 | 6. | 1 | Expectation 7.1 | 31 | Amendment | Stress tests are not as a rule deployed directly to quantify risk. The reference should be deleted. In addition, in accordance with the previous comments (see in particular the general comments), the Guide should make it clear at this point that the intensity of the risk management measures depends on their materiality. We regard the requirement for a (documented) justification at management level in the event that climate-related and environmental risks are viewed as not material as being too far-reaching. Rather, climate-related and environmental risks represent a risk driver with effects on existing types of risk, not a separate type of risk. In the interest of consistency, the right to opt for regarding climate-related and environmental risks as an independent type of risk should be deleted. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 20 | Chapter 6 | 6.1 | Expectation 7.2 | 32 | Clarification | We do not (at least at the present time) regard a separate quantification of climate-related and environmental risks apart from the customary financial and non-financial risks as being necessary in each case, and such quantification would currently have weak chances of success in view of the poor quality of the data and the historical data at the present time. A review of whether in the case of each type of risk the modelling appropriately captures the parameters influenced by climate-related and environmental risks as risk drivers should be carried out in the context of model validation and/or adequacy assessment. Our experience indicates that a separate quantification using a poorly conceived procedure could even be counterproductive for the future acceptance by institutions of similar risk management approaches to climate-related and environmental risk in general, there should be a sufficient lead time for relevant data to be collected and processes and methods developed in research and practice that could then usefully be applied at a later date. With regard to the quantitative consideration of climate-related and environmental risks, we request specific clarification or an example of observed practice. The example of observed practice in box 7 describes the preparation and steering effects of environmental ratings and hence above all external effects; however, it does not describe the institution's perception of risk. The appropriateness of translating this into increased risk weights in the ICAAP is, however, not apparent to us. Expectation 7.2 should be limited to the case of materiality. | Inappropriate level of policy detail and additional example of application | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|----|-----------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|--|--|--------------------|---------|
| 21 | Chapter 6 | 6.1 | Expectation 7.4 | 33 | Clarification | With regard to a risk audit at the level of individual borrowers, we require further clarification as to what this assessment should include, in the inception of a transaction and on an ongoing basis, and what role it should play in the granting of loans. With regard to the so-called "due diligence" referred to in Expectation 7.4, we wish to point out that proportionality criteria are lacking and that the concept is inappropriate (cf. our comments on Section 5.3). This requirement should depend on the nature and scope of the business relationship and the materiality of any risks. In our view, it would not be appropriate to conduct such an audit in the case of every client relationship; in view of the very considerable effort and expense associated with such an audit, it should be presented in a more nuanced way. That is, the requirement should not only take a risk factor into account (depending on the sector and geographical location of the customer); instead, the general requirement of such an audit should also be linked in general to materiality, e.g. the extent of the commitment. | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 2: | Chapter 6 | 6.1 | Expectation 7.5 | 34 | Amendment | We do not regard an assessment of the impact of environmental and climate-related risks on institutions' capital adequacy as appropriate since the grounds stated above indicate that separate quantification is not a suitable approach, valid effects on capital development are difficult to grasp and the capital resources can only be assessed in relation to the aggregate risk. In addition, inclusion in the economic perspective should depend on the assessment of the impact of the risk drivers related to climate and the environment and on the effects of the risk types as part of the risk inventory. Nor do we regard it as useful to repeat in this document statements of the ICAAP Guideline of the ECB, in some cases using different terminology. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|----|-----------|-----|-----------------|----|-----------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| 2: | Chapter 6 | 6.2 | Expectation 8 | 35 | Amendment | The comments are dispensable. A reference to the EBA Guidelines on Loan originating and Monitoring would be sufficient, especially since these Guidelines take proportionality aspects into account and make an appropriate distinction between a – voluntary – lending practice that is ecologically sustainable on the one hand and risk management on the other. Example of observed practice 9 deals with the first of these aspects and hence is not appropriate here. Many of the expectations reflect the current requirements contained in European or national rules and thus represent a duplication that increases complexity. We assume that the adjustment of the rating classification prescribed in Expectation 8.2 refers to an adjustment of the credit rating. The credit rating should in any event take into account all the aspects of the borrower that are relevant to creditworthiness; it cannot reflect ESG aspects that go beyond this. In particular, the requirement that "the climate-related and environmental factors material to the default risk of the loan exposure are to be identified and assessed" by the individual institutions is inappropriate given that this cannot currently be based on fundamental and recognised academic studies drawing on quantitative data sets for the institutions. Individual institutions are clearly definable on the basis of historical portfolio data and demonstrably increase the loan risk in comparison with the procedures that are currently established. This is all the more the case given that management of the factor "regulatory risk" plays a not insignificant role with regart to the effect of transition risks on a company's cash flow. The increased data requirements for the borrowing company in order to take the requirement of a significantly deeper understanding of the borrower's business model into account does not seem appropriate in the context of the current debate on the provision of business data. On the other hand, the supervisory expectation of inclusion of climate and environ | Linkage with other standard setters | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 24 | Chapter 6 | 6.2 | Expectation 8.5 | 36 | Deletion | A pricing in of climate-related and environmental factors beyond the basic risk costs does not seem reasonable; it would represent interference in the business autonomy of the institutions and could lead to mismanagement impulses. Hence a further emphasis on automatic pricing demarcated from supply and demand, business policy and risk costs, is superfluous and possibly even counterproductive. Moreover, the requirements may in general potentially lead to unintended consequences, in particular for sectors faced with significant challenges in the transition to a low carbon economy that may already be affected by poor credit ratings. We would definitely prefer a setting of incentives rather than additional costs for the granting of credit. The integration of climate-related and environmental risks in lending guidelines is in our view sufficient provided that, as stated above, there are general, standardised and rating-relevant factors that could ultimately be integrated into established pricing procedures. The expectation represents an unreasonable disadvantage for institutions and companies that operate at the regional or local level. The example of observed practice (box 9) according to which depending on energy efficiency, different prices for loans or a sector- specific or customer-specific fee is envisaged should be deleted. From the risk perspective, the relevant risk parameters (PD, LGD) are decisive for pricing. Qualitative premiums or penalites for climate-related and environmental factors should not be required here. As long as it has not been clearly demonstrated (by studies) that "green" loans are less risk, "green" cannot and should not be generally equated with "low risk". In the view of the institutions, the loan offer depends on business policy and the costs of the risk. A further emphasis on any automatism as in Expectation 8.5 is hence superfluous and possibly even counterproductive and should therefore be deleted. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
|----|-----------|-----|-----------------|----|---------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| 25 | Chapter 6 | 6.3 | Expectation 9.1 | 40 | Clarification | In footnote 85 there is a reference to note 31 of the EBA Guidelines on outsourcing (EBA/GL/2019/02) dealing with the evaluation of the outsourced function. However, in this context the evaluation and management of operational risks is related above all to the service provider and is covered by emergency plans or business continuity plans (see Sections 12.3 and 9 of the outsourcing Guidelines). We recommend that the reference be adjusted. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 26 | Chapter 6 | 6.4 | Expectation 10 | 40 | Amendment | Like the ECB, we also see the need to include climate-related and environmental risks in the management of market risk positions. However, in the case of goods and commodity price risks, it is only necessary to consider and analyse key positions. Market risk positions are automatically taken into account on a regular basis since price changes of securities are determined by various parameters and hence also by climate-related and environmental risks. Isolated consideration restricted to climate-related and environmental risks. Isolated consideration restricted to climate-related and environmental risks. Isolated consideration restricted to climate-related and environmental risks asolated parameters have systematic effects on assets. In this regard there is an urgent need for action. Initial approaches are already available in the market; however, they are not robust enough to permit clear conclusions to be drawn regarding the general evaluation of marker trisk positions in the future. This is because even enterprises for whom these parameters have little or no significance are not automatically a higher risk for this reason. We do not deny that climate-related and environmental risks could alter the availability of and the demand for financing instruments, products and services, which would also be reflected in their value. Nor do we deny that investments of institutions in companies with a business model that is not viewed as ecologically sustainable, or whose facilities are located in areas subject to a high physical risk, could lose value if there is a change in political measures, market sentiment or technology, or if major weather events occur or climate conditions gradually worsen. However, no specific findings in this regard are available. Even enterprises meeting all ESG criteria may experience difficulties for whatever reason. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to conduct sensitivity analyses on the basis of scenarios specific. The same applies to foring nurency positions. The climate-related and environ | Problem of time and lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 2 | 7 Chapter 6 | 6.5 | Expectation 11 | 41 | Amendment | Particularly in the case of climate-related and environmental risks it is by no means a minor task to develop a realistic narrative for a scenario, to model the interactions based on the scenario and to derive from this the impacts on specific key indicators (e.g. VAR, profit and loss account, capital ratio, etc.). Even the climate scenarios used as the basis are based on many assumptions. The following breakdown of the implications for individual countries, sectors and clients again requires assumptions to be made, the overall result of which is that the outcome of a scenario analysis is subject to corresponding uncertainties. The assumptions and limits of scenario analyses or stress tests, especially in the field of climate-related and environmental risk, should be taken into consideration. Hence it would be negligent for management to accept supervisory or internal stress tests without reflection. The recommendation to set a long term for the risks should be deleted. As far as appropriate, longer-term effects are already taken into account in the economic perspective. A view that is too long term would only increase uncertainty in the final analysis and would not generate reliable management impulses. The comments on Expectation 11 state inter alia that institutions "are expected to define the assumptions for their own risk profile and individual specifications, as well as consider several scenarios based on different combinations of assumptions." This places extremely high demands on banks. The selection of possible and above all relevant future scenarios is already difficult with regard to the classic types of risk. Hence the comments should be cut. | Problem of time and lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 21 | 3 Chapter 6 | 6.5 | Expectation 11 | 42 | Deletion | We regard the expectation that institutions should take into account the relevance of scenarios relating to climate-related and environmental risk when designing recovery planning processes as being too far-reaching. An effect so dramatic that banks come to require restructuring due to climate-related impacts appears to be possible only via the classical risks. However, these are already included in the existing requirements. This additional expectation should be deleted. Instead, the Guide could explicitly mention that climate-related and environmental risks can in principle also lead to greater losses via their impact on classical risks, and that such risks are already taken into account in the requirements for recovery planning processes. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 29 | Chapter 6 | 6.6 | Expectation 12 | 43 | Clarification | Solving the problem of data is central to conducting various scenario analyses on payment outflows and the depletion of liquidity buffers. In Section 6.6, the ECB has articulated Expectation no 12, according to which institutions should assess whether material climate- related and environmental risks could cause significant net cash outflows or depletion of liquidity buffers. If this is the case, these factors must be incorporated into their liquidity risk management scenario. Building on the general principles of the Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP), the ECB gives various examples of a procedure to evaluate both direct and indirect impacts. The requirements set forth necessitate a new control process for the materiality audit of climate-related and environmental risks in the liquidity regime and hence fundamental extensions of the simulation process. New methodological and data technology solutions must be found for implementing the various scenario analyses. This means that in this sphere also, the institutions still have significant conceptional activities and implementation requirements. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 30 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13 | 44-45 | Amendment | It should be clarified that due to the lack of availability of data on the part of clients, the financial institutions are not yet in a position to report on all the indicators named in the non-binding guidelines of the EU Commission; that is, the real economy must first meet the requirements of these guidelines and Article 8 of the Taxonomy Regulation before the institutions will be able to do so. A convergence phase could possibly be introduced, so that disclosure of the indicators of the financial institutions will be able to do the quired with a delay of e.g. 2 years from the time that the real economy meets these requirements. Additionally, a duplication of the information on the indicators in various reports (Pillar 3, NFE) of one institution is superfluous. We also propose the following modification: "The assessment of the materiality of climate-related and environmental risks could therefore be performed using both qualitative and quantitative information." We explicitly reject the mandatory assessment of data as material on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative criteria as being utterly disproportionate since this is also not required by the corresponding EBA guidelines for other disclosure information. Furthermore, such an evaluation might not be consistent with a delimitation of materiality in the frame of non-financial reporting. The ECB calls for harmony with the non-binding guidelines of the EU Commission; however, these guidelines focus on broader perspectives. Privo to the ECB pursuing any "inside out" perspective, it would be vitat to clarify, together with relevant stakeholders including legislative bodies, further supervisory authorities and standard setters, how supervisory disclosure should dovetail with reporting under accounting rules (risk report in the management report) and non-financial reporting. | Inappropriate level of policy detail and in the time of application; linkage with other standard setters | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 31 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13 | 44 | Amendment | We are also strongly against any application of individual requirements of the ECB Guide, in particular the disclosure requirements, to less significant institutions; see also our general comments and the remarks on Chapter 2.3. Nor does the BaFin Guidance Notice on dealing with sustainability risks that is addressed to less significant institutions express any expectations in terms of disclosure. We therefore request the ECB, if less significant institutions are not to be completely removed from the scope of application of the Guide, to consider expressly limiting the comprehensive disclosure obligations to institutions within the scope of application of Article 449a CRR II. | Relevance of the proportionality approach | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 32 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.1 | 44 | Amendment | In our view it is the task of the EBA and not the ECB to formulate specific requirements for supervisory disclosure (Pillar III). Article 449a CRR II provides for a binding disclosure of ESG risks for large capital market-oriented institutions as of 28 June 2022. We therefore regard it as inappropriate to restrict the scope of application and the implementation period. Nor should the elaborations of the EBA in accordance with its mandate pursuant to Article 434 CRR II be anticipated. We do not regard it as appropriate that even before the EBA has fulfilled its mandate to elaborate this disclosure obligation under Article 434 CRR II a corresponding disclosure obligation is created that according to the schedule presented by the ECB could even take effect as early as from 31 December 2020. The ECB may in the interim make selected information on climate-related and environmental risks the subject of a report to the Joint Supervisory Teams, but it should maintain a distance from a modification of Pillar III, since any differing requirements of various standard setters in the corming years will only cause confusion among the public and/or the addressees of the disclosure and will also not ensure any comparability of the information over time or in terms of content beyond the credit institutions. | Fundamental positioning of the Guide | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 33 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.2 | 45 | Amendment | The ECB's expectation regarding the disclosure of relevant information on the degree of realisation and progress would certainly make institutions more accountable for backing defined targets with specific measures and enabling them to be monitored; it is, however, doubtful whether supervisory disclosure is the appropriate medium for this and whether the insight of the addressees of Pillar III with regard to their economic decisions will be improved. This applies in particular if one observes the further level of detail of the proposed disclosures. In particular, we regard information on Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions as unrealistic from the present perspective given the lack of wide availability of analysable data relating to loan transactions. We strongly reject this level of detail of disclosure, also in view of the lack of elaborations of an EU taxonomy. If an institution regards climate-related risks as immaterial, it is expected to document this judgment with the available qualitative and quantitative information on which the assessment is based. The requirement should take into account the fact that quantitative climate-related metrics are currently being developed and hence quantitative information on materiality will remain limited to a certain degree. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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| 34 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.3 | 46 | | We propose that the following passage be deleted: ("in terms of dates and outstanding volumes by geographic area") since the volume of excluded financing cannot be reported. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
| 35 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.5 | 48 | Amendment | The ECB expects greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 1, 2 and 3) for the whole group to be disclosed. However, the fact is that currently banks lack comprehensive climate-relevant data of their clients, at least with respect to a large part of the portfolios. Hence the ECB should take into account that climate-related data bases, together with climate-related metrics, are in the process of development and therefore will not yet be available for large parts of the portfolio by the end of 2020. We call for Scope 3 specifications to be deleted since they cannot be widely implemented in the short term. | Inappropriate level of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
| 36 | Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.5 | 48 | Clarification | "This could, for instance, entail a project-by-project approach to measuring the carbon intensity of large corporate portfolios and the property-by-property measurement of actual energy consumption or energy efficiency classification for real estate portfolios." What is the volume of corporate portfolios that the ECB views as a "large portfolio"? It would be very helpful to specify a threshold value. What is the connection to materiality in view of Scope 1-3? "The amount or percentage of carbon-related assets in each portfolio in € millions or as a percentage of the current portfolio value From what (threshold) carbon value does the ECB regard assets as having a significant carbon component? Could, for example, a higher-level, sector-specific allocation be made in this regard? | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |

| 37 Chapter 7 | 7 | Expectation 13.7 | 49 | Clarification | "Institutions are expected to explicitly consider the need for further disclosures". What is to be the basis for a decision on the climate and environment-related risks that banks should additionally take into account in their disclosures? | Lack of policy detail | Drefahl, Christian | Publish |
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