

Template for comments

ECB Guide on the notification of securitisation transactions

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General comments

We have serious reservations about the ECB's proposed guide. Contrary to the ECB's explicitly stated intention, the guide will most certainly introduce new reporting requirements and thus run directly counter to the politically declared wish to facilitate securitisation in the EU. In our view, the reporting requirements will generate significant additional costs, which will have an especially adverse effect on the provision of ABCP finance for SMEs.

We are particularly critical of the fact that the guide will oblige banks to report once again information that they have already submitted to their competent authorities in the context of supervisory reporting. We would welcome it if, in the interests of cost-efficiency, the ECB used existing reporting channels and the data thus obtained instead of establishing further separate reporting requirements.

Should the ECB have a legitimate interest in collecting certain information over and above that required under the Securitisation Regulation and the associated technical standards, these reporting requirements should be better integrated into existing formats in order to avoid duplicate reporting and ensure data consistency. We would also like to recommend that the ECB work in the context of the Securitisation Regulation review towards deleting existing reporting requirements which do not serve a useful purpose. We would like to refer you in particular to our attached response of 22 September 2021 to the targeted consultation on the securitisation framework, and especially to our reply to question 2.5. on private bilateral or closed-group transactions.

Furthermore, the guide contains no provision for permitting significant institutions to delegate compliance with the recommendations to another entity, such as the securitisation issuer. This despite the fact that Article 7 of the Securitisation Regulation allows such delegation and that this practice is commonly used in the market. The guide would thus require such institutions to put their own reporting regimes in place (potentially alongside those for the relevant securitisation). This would, moreover, apply to all securitisations, whether public or private and whether STS or not.

Based on past experience it will not be possible at this stage to address all open questions in detail. It would therefore be helpful if the ECB, like ESMA, offered a Q&A function after publication of its final guide and template and published the ensuing questions and answers

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Please enter all your feedback in this list.

When entering feedback, please make sure that:

- each comment deals with a single issue only;
- you indicate the relevant article/chapter/paragraph, where appropriate;
- you indicate whether your comment is a proposed amendment, clarification or deletion.

Deadline:

5/1/2022

ı	D	Chapter	Section	Page	Type of comment	Detailed comment	 Name of commenter	Personal data
	1	Chapter 1	Footnote 3	2	Clarification	We would appreciate clarification that there will be no backloading, i.e. transactions originated before 1 April 2022 will not be covered by "during the life" reporting requirements. Although the proposed guide states that its recommendations are intended to apply to any securitisation which creates new securitisation positions on or after 1 April 2022 (to be in line with Article 43(9) of the Securitisation Regulation), they also seem to permit the ECB to request information on securitisation transactions originated before that date on a case-bycase basis. So in practice, there may not actually be any grandfathering at all. Extending these obligations to historic securitisations would cause practical problems for SIs as they would not have envisaged having to comply with such requirements at the time	Krohne, Felix	Publish
	2	Chapter 2	2.2	4	Clarification	We would appreciate clarification of which requirements will be replaced by those set out in the ECB's guide. Compliance with the guide will require additional effort due to the newly introduced CASPER interface.	Krohne, Felix	Publish

	T	-	1	T	IAlthough the guide states that it "does not intend to	ī	T	T
		1			Although the guide states that it "does not intend to			
					introduce any new requirements", many of the points			
					listed in the Annex are indeed new reporting			
					requirements, especially those in Sections C and D in			
					respect of Articles 6 and 8 of the SECR. While institutions			
					are certainly required to comply with these articles, they			
3	Chapter 2	2.2	4	Clarification	are not obliged at present to document in detail how their		Krohne, Felix	Publish
	l '				compliance is achieved.		,	
					Also, the "during the life" reporting requirement with			
					respect to "any material events in relation to			
					compliance with Articles 6 to 8 SECR" (Chapter 3, page			
					6) is broader than the requirements of Article 7(1)(g) of			
					the SECR. We would appreciate clarification of the CASPER			
					onboarding process and its functioning. Will there, for			
	01		_	Ol: fi 4			Karbara Fallar	D. J. P. L
4	Chapter 3		5	Clarification	example, be an online questionnaire or a posssibility to		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					upload information? We believe that workshops would be			
					helpful.			
				6 Clarification	It should be clarified whether or not information has to be			
					provided both on a contínuous basis AND after a material		Krohne, Felix	
			6		event. Further below (on page 11) the ECB states that			
					during the lifetime of the transaction a notification is			
5	Chapter 3				required only after a material event (but not on a			Publish
					continuous basis). Therefore it should be clarified that			
					any reporting required hereunder is either at closing or in			
					the event of material changes. See also our remarks			
					below on page 11.			
					"The Guide therefore recommends that SIs acting as			
					originators or sponsors for either private or public			
					securitisations notify the ECB of compliance of these			
					transactions with Articles 6 to 8 SECR.			
					Notifications are expected to be submitted in a dedicated			
					template [via the CASPER platform]".			
					With regard to the technical standards which entered into			
					force on 23 September 2020 and the 15 reporting			
				5 Clarification				
6	Chapter 3		5		templates available on		Krohne, Felix	Publish
	'				https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-		,	
					activities/securitisation#title-paragrah-4:			
					under Article 7(1) of the SECR a reporting obligation "to			
					the competent authorities" already exists (for SIs) with			
		1			respect to private ABSs. Please explain the reason for			
		1			additional reporting of any information required under			
		1			Article 7(1)(a) to (g) via separate channels. In particular,			
					SIs already provide the ECB with information required			
		1			under Article 7 of the SECR			
		1			"to be submitted in a dedicated template [via the			
_			I_		CASPER platform]": would this be a different template to		l.,	
7	Chapter 3		5	Clarification	those published at https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					activities/securitisation?			
	1				เลอแทนเอง/จออนาเมือนเปา:			1

		1		"to be submitted in a dedicated template [via the			
				CASPER platform]": we see no benefit in using different			
8 Chapter 3		5	Deletion	templates to those published on		Krohne, Felix	Publish
o i o i i aprior o		ľ	2 3.34.3	https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-			
				activities/securitisation.			
				Footnote 7/"new transactions be notified to the ECB			
				within two weeks of the date of origination": our			
				understand is that footnote 7 actually refers to the			
9 Chapter 3	Footnote 7	5	Clarification	"closing" of a transaction (i.e. the issuance of funding		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				instruments). The term "origination" may lead to			
				confusion.			
				"new transactions be notified to the ECB within two			
				weeks of the date of origination": we think any reporting			
				dates should be aligned with those already in place under			
				implementation of Article 7 of the SECR to avoid			
10 Chapter 3		5	Clarification	redundant work streams. Also, data might not be ready		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				for delivery at a different date as procedures are			
				calibrated for reporting in accordance with Article 7 of the			
				SECR.			
				As a general point, there should be no overlaps or double			
11 Annex Section	Α	8	Clarification	reporting. Information which is already reported under		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				Article 7 of the SECR should be exempted.		,	
				Information about the SRT status is already submitted to			
		8	Deletion	competent authorities in the application for recognition of		Krohne, Felix	
12 Annex Section	A 3(c)			a significant risk transfer (SRT). Duplicate provision of the			Publish
				information should be avoided.			
				Details of the "nominal amount of the underlying			
				exposure" are already reported to competent authorities		Krohne, Felix	
		8		in accordance with Article 7(1)(a) of the SECR. Duplicate			
13 Annex Section	A 5		Deletion	reporting should be avoided. Should this reporting			Publish
				requirement nevertheless be retained, we assume it will			
				be sufficient to report the nominal amount at the time the			
				transaction is closed, not monthly updates on changes.			
				Details of the "nominal amount of the tranches" are			
				already reported to competent authorities in accordance			
				with Article 7(1)(a) of the SECR. Duplicate reporting			
14 Annex Section	A 6	8	Deletion	should be avoided. Should this reporting requirement		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				nevertheless be retained, we assume it will be sufficient			
				to report the nominal amount at the time the transaction is			
				closed, not monthly updates on changes.			
				A private ABS is not offered to investors. The SI			
				finances/invests in a private ABS transaction wholly (or			
				partially together pari passu with other banks). 100% of			
15 Annex Section	A 9	8	8 Clarification	the private ABS transaction is funded at closing. All		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				funding parties (banks) will have untertaken credit			
				procedures before closing and no other investor will need			
				any information.			

		1	T		The election of the underlying arms in		<u> </u>	1
					The classification of the underlying exposures in			
40	Annex Section B	1			accordance with Article 2 of Delegated Regulation (EU)		Karlan - Falla	D. J. F. J.
16			9	Deletion	2020/1224 already has to be reported to competent		Krohne, Felix	Publish
				1	authorities under Article 7(1)(a) of the SECR. Duplicate			
					reporting should be avoided.			
					The classification of the underlying exposures in			
				.	accordance with Annex XI of Delegated Regulation (EU)			
17	Annex Section B	3	9	Deletion	2020/1224 already has to be reported to competent	Kro	Krohne, Felix	Publish
					authorities under Article 7(1)(a) of the SECR. Duplicate			
					reporting should be avoided.			
18	Annex Section B	4	10	Clarification	It is not clear exactly what information is supposed to be		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					reported about a "portfolio in the ramp-up phase".		,	
19	Annex Section B	5	10	Clarification	It is not clear whether this notification requirement only		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					refers to loans.		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
20	Annex Section C	1	10	Clarification	It is not clear how transactions are supposed to be		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					reported if they have no final legal maturity.		,	
21	Annex Section C	2	10	Clarification	It is not clear exactly what information is supposed to be		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					reported here. This information already has to be reported to competent			
20		3	10	Deletion			Kaalana Falis	Duklish
22	Annex Section C				authorities under Article 7(1)(a) of the SECR. Duplicate		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					reporting should be avoided. We believe a distinction should be made about who has			
22	Ammay Caatian C	4	10	Olawifia atiaw			Kaalana Falis	Duklish
23	Annex Section C	4	10	Clarification	retained the risk since this will give rise to different	Kiolile, Felix	Krohne, Felix	Publish
					requirements. It is not clear exactly what information is supposed to be			
				Clarification	reported here. Please check the reference to Article 8(4)			
24	Annex Section C	10	10		of the SECR, which sets out exemptions from the		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					definition of "resecuritisation" for ABCP programmes. It is not clear to us why Sis should have to reconfirm that			
					they have complied with rules that are (for the most part)			
					binding under the SECR. On top of that, we consider the			
					amount of information required to be excessive. Banks			
					will have to invest considerable time and effort compiling			
					these data which, given the sheer scale involved,			
					supervisors are unlikely to be able to evaluate in a			
					meaningful way. Banks are naturally prepared to answer			
				Deletion	specific questions about individual transactions. This			
					should be sufficient to satisfy supervisors' interest in			
25	Annex Section D	1	10		obtaining information. Furthermore, SIs will have to		Krohne, Felix	Publish
20	ATTION COOLOTT D	1	' '	Bolotion	provide written confirmation that a securitisation complies		Tarana, r cax	dollon
					with Articles 6 to 8 of the SECR and with any applicable			
					delegated regulations and that the information provided			
					reflects the "actual arrangements and features" of the			
					securitisation. This (particularly confirmation of aspects			
					regarding the "actual arrangements") goes beyond what			
					is currently delivered by originators, sponsors, etc. and			
1				1	will potentially alter (or at least fail to reflect) the burden of			
i								
					responsibility for describing the transaction in			
		1	1		raccompanying material		<u> </u>	l

				T	This information already has to be provided unter Section			
26	Annex Section D	2	11	Deletion	A, no. 9 of the Annex to the ECB guide. The requirement		Krohne, Felix	Publish
	1				should therefore be deleted from Section D.			
					It should be clarified that there is no need to make this			
					information available to investors if an institution is			
					funding a transaction which is not offered to investors.			
					Detailed description of such a case: the SI			
					finances/invests in a private ABS transaction wholly (or			
		1(b)(iii) and			partially together pari passu with other banks). 100% of			
2	Annex Section D	2 / /	10, 11	Clarification	the private ABS transaction is funded at closing. All		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					funding parties (banks) have received full information and			
					have untertaken credit procedures before closing. There			
					is no other investor who would need any information. The			
					SI has already provided the ECB with the information			
					required under Article 7 of the SECR. The Annex contains an ongoing requirement for SIs to			
		n D 3			provide an assessment at least every two years of how its			
					internal policies and procedures ensure compliance with			
					Articles 6 to 8 of the SECR. It is not clear how this would	Krohne, Felix		
					be structured to align with the existing monitoring of ECB-			
					regulated entities or whether this is in fact an additional			
					obligation. Though banks are happy to answer specific			
					questions about individual transactions, they oppose the			
_					idea of preparing extensive documents ex ante whose			
28	Annex Section D		11	Deletion	number and scale make it unlikely that they will actually		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					be read. What is more, such a requirement is nowhere to			
					be found in the SECR. This goes especially for the			
					frequency of "at least every 2 years". Should the			
					requirement nevertheless be retained, it should be			
					clarified whether it can be met by reviews of the			
					processes concerned by external auditors in the course of			
					the annual audit (these are normally carried out as and			
					when required rather than at fixed intervals) Most private ABS transactions and trade receivable			
					transactions, in particular, often have similar structures to			
					ensure compliance with Articles 6 to 8 of the SECR.			
	Annex Section D				Should the requirement to demonstrate compliance with			
29		3	11	Clarification	Articles 6 to 8 be retained, it should be clarified that It will		Krohne, Felix	Publish
					not always be nessecary to involve senior management in			
					such cases. Corresponding contractual undertakings by			
					the originator of a securitisation are usually in place,			
					especially with respect to Articles 6 and 8.			

30 Annex Sec	on D	11	Clarification	The guide recommends notifying the ECB without undue delay of any material event or change affecting or likely to affect the features of the transaction, particularly in relation to Articles 6 to 8 of the SECR. Leaving aside the potential duplication of existing equivalent transparency obligations under the SECR, the open/non-exhaustive way in which this is drafted suggests that SIs will be required to undertake a more general monitoring/notification role for the benefit of the ECB than that set out in the SECR.		Krohne, Felix	Publish
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