Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on non-performing loans: supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning of non-performing exposures

March 2018
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Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on non-performing loans: supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning of non-performing exposures
1 Background

On 20 March 2017 the ECB published its Guidance to banks on non-performing loans\(^1\) (NPL Guidance). The NPL Guidance clarifies supervisory expectations regarding the identification, management, measurement and write-off of NPLs in the context of existing regulations, directives and guidelines.

The NPL Guidance stresses the importance of timely provisioning and write-off practices related to non-performing loans\(^2\), as these serve to strengthen banks’ balance sheets, enabling them to (re)focus on their core business, most notably lending to the economy.

This Addendum supplements the NPL Guidance by specifying the ECB’s supervisory expectations when assessing a bank’s levels of prudential provisions for non-performing exposures (NPEs)\(^3\). As detailed further below, the ECB will in this context assess, among other things, the length of time an exposure has been classified as non-performing (i.e. its “vintage”) as well as the collateral held (if any). The ECB’s supervisory expectations set out what the ECB deems to be a prudent treatment of NPEs. Its aim is to avoid an excessive build-up of non-covered aged NPEs on banks’ balance sheets in the future, which would require supervisory measures. This Addendum does not substitute or supersede any applicable regulatory or accounting requirements.

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1 Guidance to banks on non-performing loans.
2 See Section 6.6 of the NPL Guidance.
3 As in the NPL Guidance, “NPL” and “NPE” are used interchangeably within this Addendum.
2 General concept

2.1 Scope

In line with the NPL Guidance, this Addendum specifies the ECB’s supervisory expectations relating to the significant banks directly supervised by it.

This Addendum does not bind banks, but serves as a basis for a supervisory dialogue. The ECB will assess any differences between banks’ practices and the prudential provisioning expectations laid out in this Addendum at least annually.

The ECB will link the supervisory expectations in this Addendum to new NPEs classified as such from 1 April 2018 onwards. Taking into account the specificities of the supervisory expectations (see Section 4.2), banks will thus be asked to inform the ECB of any differences between their practices and the prudential provisioning expectations, as part of the SREP supervisory dialogue, from early 2021 onwards.

2.2 General prudential framework

As also outlined in Chapter 6.1 of the NPL Guidance, the existing prudential framework requires supervisors to make decisions as to whether banks’ provisions are adequate and timely.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) highlights the responsibility of supervisors to assess banks’ processes for credit risk management control and asset valuation, as well as to ensure that they have sufficient loan loss provisions, particularly from the standpoint of the assessment of credit risk exposures and capital adequacy. This is reflected in the respective guidelines, including:

- BCBS “Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses” (2015) and EBA “Guidelines on credit institutions’ credit risk management practices and accounting for expected credit losses” (2017);
- BCBS “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” (2012), and Basel II, Pillar 2 (2006).

More specifically, the following articles of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) are relevant.

- Article 74 requires banks to have “adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures, […] that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management”.

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• Article 79(b) and (c) requires the competent authorities to ensure that “institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors […] and credit risk at the portfolio level” and “the ongoing administration and monitoring of the various credit risk-bearing portfolios and exposures of institutions, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making adequate value adjustments and provisions, is operated through effective systems”.

• In addition, Article 88 includes the principle that “the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards.”

• In accordance with Article 97(1), the competent authorities must review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions to comply with the CRD and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). Article 97(3) of the CRD IV further specifies that “…the competent authorities shall determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions and the own funds and liquidity held by them ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks.”

• In this regard, Article 104(1) enumerates the minimum powers that the competent authorities must have, including, under (b), the power “to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 73 and 74”, and, under (d), “to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements”. This is also reflected in the EBA’s “Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP)”, paragraph 479(a) of which states that the competent authorities may require the institution to “apply a specific provisioning policy, and – where permitted by accounting rules and regulations – require it to increase provisions”.

Therefore, as part of the current regulatory regime, supervisors need to determine whether banks have effective provisioning methodologies and processes, which should ensure that NPE-related risks are adequately covered. Furthermore, the ECB is allowed “to require credit institutions to apply specific adjustments (deductions, filters or similar measures) to own funds calculations where the accounting treatment applied by the bank is considered not prudent from a supervisory perspective.”

As part of this process, supervisors should provide guidance as to their expectations. The Addendum is to be seen in this context.

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2.3 Functioning of the supervisory expectations

The prudential provisioning expectations outlined in this Addendum supplement the NPL Guidance by specifying what the ECB deems to be prudent levels of provisions. Figure 1 provides an overview of the prudential provisioning concept.

In its assessment of a bank’s levels of provisions for NPEs, the ECB will take into account the level of existing credit protection and, crucially, the NPE vintage category. Section 3.2 specifies which forms of collateral or other forms of credit risk protection will be considered by the ECB to be adequate from a prudential perspective. The prudential provisioning expectations are defined in Section 4.

Figure 1
Overview of the prudential provisioning concept

The quantitative prudential expectations may go beyond, but not stand in contradiction to, accounting rules. If the applicable accounting treatment is not considered prudent from a supervisory perspective, the accounting provisioning level is fully integrated in the banks’ supply to meet the supervisory expectation.

A bank’s supply for the purposes of the prudential provisioning expectations is made up of the following items:

1. all accounting provisions under the applicable accounting standard including potential newly booked provisions;7

2. expected loss shortfalls for the respective exposures in default in accordance with Articles 158 and 159 of the CRR, and other CET 1 deductions from own funds related to these exposures.8

Banks are encouraged to close potential gaps relative to the prudential expectations by booking the maximum level of provisions possible under the applicable accounting standard. If the applicable accounting treatment does not match the

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7 Partial write-offs made since the most recent NPE classification can also be included where relevant.

8 Unless other CET 1 deductions are already reflected in the calculations of expected loss shortfalls.
prudential provisioning expectations, banks also have the possibility to adjust their Common Equity Tier 1 capital on their own initiative.9

During the supervisory dialogue – at least annually in the context of the SREP – the ECB will discuss with banks any divergences from the prudential provisioning expectations outlined in this Addendum.

When assessing such divergences, the ECB will consider specific circumstances (e.g. pulling effect) which may make the prudential provisioning expectations inappropriate for a specific portfolio/exposure. Such circumstances might include, for example, a situation where a debtor verifiably makes regular partial payments amounting to a significant portion of the initial contractual payments, if those payments enable the exposure to be cured10 irrespectively of whether it is past due or unlikely to pay, or where the application of the supervisory expectations would, in combination with Pillar 1 capital requirements for credit risk, result in more than 100% of the exposure being covered, or any other relevant circumstances. In this context, any portfolio-specific robust evidence can be used to inform the supervisory dialogue.

In the course of the supervisory dialogue the ECB will assess any differences between the ECB’s supervisory expectations and an individual bank’s provisioning approach. This process might include off-site activities such as deep dives performed by the respective Joint Supervisory Team (JST), on-site examinations or both. The outcome of the supervisory assessment will be taken into account in the Single Supervisory Mechanism SREP. If, after giving due consideration to the specific circumstances presented by a bank, the ECB is of the view that its prudential provisions do not adequately cover the expected credit risk, a supervisory measure under Pillar 2 framework might be adopted.

The general relevance of the Addendum is to be assessed on exposure level (i.e. the date of the last NPE classification and respective NPE vintage). The starting point of the supervisory dialogue will be an assessment performed at the applicable consolidation level (solo, sub-consolidated or consolidated in line with the SREP approach). This could be followed by further supervisory analysis on a more granular level if need be.

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9 Where banks decide to make deductions from CET1 capital on their own initiative, those deductions are to be reported in the common reporting (COREP) template C01.00 in row 524 “(-) Additional deductions of CET1 Capital due to Article 3 CRR”.

10 Also taking into account Chapters 4 and 5.3.3 of the ECB NPL Guidance.
3 Definitions applied in this Addendum

3.1 Definition of new NPEs and vintage count

For the purposes of this Addendum, “new NPEs” are all those exposures that are reclassified from performing to non-performing in line with the EBA's definition\(^{11}\) after 1 April 2018, irrespective of their classification at any moment prior to that date.

This Addendum uses an “NPE vintage” concept for the application of the supervisory expectations. In this context, an NPE’s vintage is defined as the number of days (converted into years) from the date on which an exposure was classified as non-performing to the relevant reporting or reference date, regardless of what triggered the NPE classification. Thus, the vintage count for “unlikely to pay” and “past due” exposures is the same, and for exposures moving from “unlikely to pay” to “past due” the counting continues and is not reset. If an exposure is reclassified as performing in line with the EBA’s Implementing Technical Standards\(^{12}\) and also taking into account Chapter 5 of the NPL Guidance, the NPE vintage count for the purposes of this Addendum is deemed to be re-set to zero.

Exposures classified as NPEs and cured before 1 April 2018 that are reclassified as non-performing after 1 April 2018 are considered to be new NPEs for the purpose of this Addendum, with the NPE vintage count starting at zero.

3.2 Credit protection to secure exposures

This Addendum applies prudential principles to define the eligibility criteria for credit protection which are used to determine which parts of NPEs are to be deemed secured or unsecured and, consequently, whether to consider supervisory expectations for secured or unsecured exposures. This is based on the premise that risk coverage may have to be increased if the accounting treatment is not considered prudent from a supervisory perspective, as outlined above.

For the purposes of this Addendum, the following types of collateral or other forms of credit risk protection are considered by the ECB as either fully or partially securing NPEs.

(a) All types of immovable property collateral.

(b) Other eligible collateral or other forms of credit risk protection that fulfil the criteria of credit risk mitigation set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapters 3

\(^{11}\) This also includes off-balance-sheet exposures as well as NPEs held by the international subsidiaries of significant institutions. For purchased NPEs, the supervisors will take into account evidence from the related due diligence process.

\(^{12}\) Final draft Implementing Technical Standards on forbearance and non-performing exposures (EBA ITS 2013/03)
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3.3 Definition of secured and unsecured parts of NPEs

The supervisory expectations set out in this Addendum distinguish between secured and unsecured (parts of) NPEs as described below.

Figure 2
Blended approach for new NPEs in scope

Generally, the supervisory expectations are relevant to all drawn and undrawn credit facilities with non-performing status. However, they may be disregarded for undrawn credit facilities which may be cancelled unconditionally at any time and without notice, or that effectively provide for automatic cancellation owing to deterioration in the borrower’s creditworthiness.

Fully unsecured exposures

For the purposes of this Addendum, NPEs are considered fully unsecured if they do not benefit from credit risk protection as described under Section 3.2. These exposures are assessed in the context of the supervisory dialogue using the supervisory expectations for unsecured exposures as further specified in Section 4.

Fully secured exposures

For the purposes of this Addendum, NPEs are considered fully secured if they benefit from credit risk protection, as described under Section 3.2, which exceeds the current drawn and potential undrawn credit facilities of the debtor. These exposures are assessed in the context of the supervisory dialogue using the supervisory expectations for secured exposures as further specified in Section 4.
Banks are expected to use as collateral values the collateral value reported for the exposure in line with the financial reporting (FINREP) instructions set out in Annex V\(^{13}\) under “Collateral and guarantees received”, corrected by deducting collateral and other credit risk protection not considered for the purposes of this Addendum (see Section 3.2). With respect to the valuation of immovable property, reference is made to Chapter 7 of the NPL Guidance, which spells out the supervisory expectations in this regard, including adequately prudent haircuts or adjustments.

**Partially secured exposures**

A blended approach is applied to NPEs which are partially collateralised (i.e. the value of credit risk protection as described in Section 3.2 does not exceed the current drawn and potential undrawn credit facilities). Once the bank has established the value of its credit risk protection, the exposure should be regarded as split into the following two elements.

1. **Secured balance**: in order to determine the secured balance of the NPE, the bank values the credit risk protection as outlined above for fully secured exposures. The secured balance is assessed in line with the supervisory expectations for secured exposures.

2. **Unsecured balance**: the unsecured balance will be equal to the original drawn and potential undrawn credit facilities minus the secured balance of the exposure. The unsecured balance is assessed in line with the supervisory expectations for unsecured exposures.

For fully and partially secured exposures, banks are expected to review regularly the collateral value in line with the NPL Guidance, and to take into account any changes in a timely manner in the context of the provisioning expectations. Given the inherent execution risk in realising the value of collateral, banks should very carefully consider cases where the secured element increases over time. Such cases should be backed by solid evidence that increased valuations are sustainable, as also outlined for immovable property in the NPL Guidance.

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4 Prudential provisioning expectations

4.1 Categories of provisioning expectations

Supervisory expectations for unsecured exposures

Fully unsecured NPEs and the unsecured balance of partially secured NPEs will be assessed by the ECB using the supervisory expectations outlined in Section 4.2.

Supervisory expectations for secured exposures

As part of the prudential framework, a bank needs to be able to realise its credit protection in a “timely manner”. If collateral has not been realised after a period of several years from the date when the underlying exposure was classified as non-performing, because of failures in the internal processes of the bank or because of reasons beyond the bank’s control (e.g. the length of time it takes to conclude legal proceedings), the collateral would in principle be deemed ineffective and as such, the exposure is expected to be treated as unsecured from a prudential perspective in the context of this Addendum. This means that full prudential provisioning is considered prudent after a period of several years.

Against this background, fully secured NPEs and the secured balance of partially secured NPEs will be assessed by the ECB in line with the supervisory expectations outlined in Section 4.2.

It should be noted that foreclosed assets do not currently fall within the scope of this Addendum. However, Section 7.5 of the NPL Guidance addresses the valuation of foreclosed assets, including adequately prudent haircuts or adjustments. Furthermore, Annex 7 of the NPL Guidance also contains reporting and disclosure recommendations for foreclosed assets, including a breakdown by vintage.

4.2 Quantitative supervisory expectations in detail

The ECB will assess prudential provisioning levels of new NPEs as defined above during the supervisory dialogue described in Section 2.3 of this Addendum, taking into account the quantitative expectations summarised in Table 1.
Table 1
Overview of the quantitative expectations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vintage of NPE</th>
<th>Unsecured part</th>
<th>Secured part</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After two years</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After three years</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After four years</td>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After five years</td>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After six years</td>
<td></td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After seven years</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To avoid cliff edge effects, a suitably gradual path towards those supervisory expectations is important, starting from the moment of NPE classification. Therefore, the ECB will assess secured exposures in the context of the supervisory dialogue, taking into account a linear path starting from year three onwards.

These expectations aim to ensure that banks do not build up aged NPEs with insufficient provision coverage. Therefore, the ECB considers that prudent provisioning implies the continuation of booking accounting provisions in line with banks’ assessments and existing accounting principles. Only in the event that the accounting treatment applied is considered not prudent from a supervisory perspective may supervisors determine adequate measures on a case-by-case basis.

During the supervisory dialogue all banks are expected to inform their respective JSTs of coverage levels by NPE vintage with regard to NPEs classified after 1 April 2018. In this context, deviations from the prudential provisioning expectations as outlined in this Addendum will be carefully scrutinised. The JSTs will provide banks with further details regarding this process, sufficiently in advance.

Furthermore, in line with the recommendations contained in Annex 7 of the NPL Guidance, banks are also encouraged to include in their public disclosures the provisions by type of asset and different NPE vintages, as this is an important means of conveying their credit risk profiles comprehensively to market participants.